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Part 1: Citizenship within Directive 2004/38 EC – Stability 
of Residence for Union Citizens and their Family Members 
 
Question 1 
 
 With respect to a Union citizen’s family members, how have Articles 2, 3 
and 5 of the Directive been transposed into national law? 
 
1. Arts 2 and 3 of Directive 2004/38 EC (hereinafter: CRD) define the categories 
of individuals who enjoy derived rights under EU law as ‘family members,’1 
‘other family members,’2 or non-married partners of Union citizens.3 The three 
distinct categories apply without reference to the nationality of the individuals 
concerned and confer distinct levels of protection. Most significantly, Art 5 CRD 
affords Union citizens and ‘family members’ a right to enter the territory of the 
host Member State on the production of certain valid documents. Arts 2, 3 and 5 of 
the CRD were transposed into UK law through Regs 7, 8 and 11 of the 
Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2006 (hereinafter: EEA 
Regulations).
4
 The European Casework Instructions, issued by the UK Border 
Agency (UKBA), supplement the EEA Regulations by providing UK immigration 
caseworkers with guidance on CRD rights.
5
 The UK has adopted special 
transitional provisions to govern the entry and residence rights of Bulgarian and 
Romanian nationals and their family members.
6
 These arrangements apply until 1
st
 
January 2014. 
 
2. The EEA Regulations categorise ‘other family members’ and non-married 
partners as ‘extended family members.’ Unless otherwise stated, we shall adopt 
this label throughout this report to refer collectively to these two specific 
categories of derived rights holders. The EEA Regulations apply to ‘EEA 
nationals,’ defined as nationals of an EEA State who are not also British citizens. 
Unless otherwise stated, reference to EEA nationals in this Report should be taken 
to include the situation of Member State nationals as Union citizens. 
                                                        
1 The Union citizen’s spouse or registered partner (where the host State treats registered 
partnerships as equivalent to marriage) and the direct descendants (under the age of 21 or 
dependent) and direct dependent relatives in the ascending line of the Union citizen and/or his or 
her spouse/civil partner (Art 2 CRD). 
2
 Persons who, in the country from which they have come, are dependants or members of the 
household of the Union citizen and persons requiring the personal care of the Union citizens on 
serious medical grounds (Art 3 CRD). 
3
 Directive 2004/38/EC of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family 
members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States (2004) OJ L 158/1. 
4
 Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations SI 2006/1003. For detailed review of the 
EEA Regulations, see e.g. H. Toner, ‘New Regulations implementing Directive 2004/38,’ (2006) 
25(4) Journal of Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Law 331. For discussion of the interface 
between the CRD/EU citizenship rights and UK immigration law, see J. Shaw, N. Miller, M. 
Fletcher, ‘Getting to grips with EU citizenship: Understanding the friction between UK 
immigration law and EU free movement law,’ (2013) Edinburgh Law School Citizenship Studies 
and J. Shaw and N. Miller, ‘When legal worlds collide: an exploration of what happens when EU 
free movement meets UK immigration law,’ (2013) 38(2) EL Rev. 137. 
5
 See http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/policyandlaw/ecis/ (all electronic 
links last accessed on 14/11/13). 
6
 Accession (Immigration and Worker Authorisation) Regulations SI 2006/3317 (as amended). 
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 How have national courts and/or tribunals dealt with the different types of 
family relationships outlined in Articles 2 and 3? 
 
3. Our findings indicate that UK courts and tribunals understand the key 
distinction established by the CRD between, on the one hand, the rights of family 
members of Union citizens and, on the other hand, the rights of their extended 
family members.
7
 National courts and tribunals recognise that persons qualifying 
as family members (Art 2 CRD/Reg 7 EEA Regulations) enjoy automatically, by 
virtue of their status as a family member of a Union citizen and irrespective of 
their nationality, a right of entry into and residence within the UK as host Member 
State. UK courts understand that, by contrast, extended family members (Art 3 
CRD/Reg 8 EEA Regulations) benefit only from a more limited procedural right; 
specifically: a right to have the UK authorities consider fully their personal 
circumstances with a view to “facilitating” their entry and residence.  
 
4. The distinction between family members and extended family members proved 
decisive before the UK courts in B v Home Office.
8
 In that decision, the High 
Court concluded that the EU law doctrine of Member State liability for breaches of 
Union law only protected the substantive rights of entry and residence afforded to 
family members under Art 2 CRD and not the procedural rights conferred on 
extended family members by Art 3 CRD.
9
 
  
 Family members 
 
5. With particular respect to family members, the case law of UK courts and 
tribunals to date has been concerned primarily with the interpretation of the two 
dependent variables in Art 2 CRD/Reg 7 of the EEA Regulations: (1) the existence 
of legal marriages between Union citizens and (usually) Third Country Nationals 
(hereinafter: TCN) spouses; and (2) the criterion of dependency.
10
 The first 
criterion has given rise to most of the case law on family members. Legal disputes 
interpreting that first criterion tend to involve judicial review of determinations of 
‘sham marriages’ made by UKBA officials. 11  In particular, UK courts have 
criticised the UKBA’s failure, in specific instances, to recognise fully the 
automatic rights of entry and residence enjoyed by TCN spouses of EU citizens 
under Union law.
12
 
 
                                                        
7
 E.g. AP (India) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKAIT 48 and Aladeselu v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] EWCA Civ 144 at paras 8-16, 52 and 54. See 
here also the recent decision of the CJEU in Case C-83/11 Secretary of State v Rahman, Judgment 
of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 5 September 2012 (nyr) at para. 21 – on preliminary reference 
from the Court of Appeal.   
8
 B v Home Office [2012] EWHC 226 (QB). 
9
 Ibid., at paras 105-119 
10
 On this point, see also Shaw et al, ‘Getting to grips with EU citizenship,’ cited supra note 4 at p. 
21. 
11
 E.g. ZH (Afghanistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] EWCA Civ 1060 
and Adetola v First-Tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) [2010] EWHC 3197 
(Admin).  
12
 ZH (Afghanistan) v Secretary of State, cited supra note 11 and Papajorgji [2012] UKUT 38 
(IAC). 
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6. The UK was one of several Member States that opted to impose an additional 
requirement of prior lawful residence (within the territory of the Union) for TCN 
family members when transposing the CRD into national law. The UK 
Government introduced this extra requirement in Reg 12(1)(b) of the EEA 
Regulations. In Metock, the Court of Justice held that EU law did not permit the 
application of such a test to determine the rights of entry and residence of TCN 
family members of Union citizens.
13
 The UK Government was extremely slow to 
respond to the Metock ruling. Reg 12(1)(b) of the EEA Regulations was not 
amended to reflect the substance of that decision until 2011.
14
 On the other hand, 
UK courts reacted more swiftly and favorably to the Metock ruling. That decision 
was followed by the English Court of Appeal in ZH (Afghanistan), prior to the 
amendment of the EEA Regulations.
15
 During the same period, the Court of 
Appeal also expressed its clear frustration with the UK Government’s initial 
delayed response to Metock. In Owusu that Court strongly criticised the Secretary 
of State’s attempt to rely, post-Metock, on Reg 12(1)(b) of the EEA Regulations in 
the knowledge that that provision was now ‘flagrantly unlawful.’16 
 
 Extended family members  
 
7. UK courts and tribunals have addressed three specific points of interpretation as 
regards the rights of extended family members. First, national courts and tribunals 
have been requested to examine the requirement that extended family members 
previously resided with the Union citizens in an EEA State before entering the 
UK.
17
 That requirement for prior EEA residence is not provided for in the CRD, 
but was (again) imposed by the UK Government through transposition, in parallel 
with its approach to family members – discussed above. 18  Secondly, national 
courts and tribunals have reviewed the requirement, included in both the CRD and 
EEA Regulations, that extended family members ‘accompany or join’ the Union 
citizen in the host Member State.
19
 Finally, UK courts have again been required to 
interpret the dependency criterion, which also applies to govern the derived rights 
of certain extended family members under both the CRD and EEA Regulations.
20
 
 
8. After some initial difficulty in places,
21
 UK courts and tribunals now appear to 
be making good progress on all three of the aforementioned key issues. First, 
following the approach for family members discussed above, national courts have 
struck down as unlawful the prior EEA residence requirement for extended family 
                                                        
13
 Case C-127/08 Metock and Others v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2008] ECR 
I-6241. 
14
 Immigration (European Economic Area) (Amendment) Regulations, SI 2011/1247. 
15
 ZH (Afghanistan) v Secretary of State, cited supra note 11.  
16
 R.(on the application of Owusu) v Secretary of State [2009] EWHC 593 (Admin). 
17
 E.g. KG (Sri Lanka) v Secretary of State [2008] EWCA Civ 13 and SM (Sri Lanka) v Secretary 
of State [2008] UKAIT 75 (AIT). 
18
 See Reg 8(2)(a) EEA Regulations. 
19
 E.g. Aladeselu v Secretary of State [2011] UKUT 253 (IAT) and Aladeselu v Secretary of State, 
cited supra note 7. 
20
 Ibid.  
21
 See esp. KG (Sri Lanka) v Secretary of State, cited supra note 16 and SM (Sri Lanka) v Secretary 
of State [2008] UKAIT 75 (AIT). In both cases UK courts struggled to assess the derived rights of 
TCNs as extended family members. 
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members introduced by Reg 8 of the EEA Regulations.
22
 Secondly, with respect to 
the requirement – permitted by the CRD – that extended family members 
‘accompany or join’ the Union citizen in the United Kingdom, national courts 
have kept pace with developments in the case law of the CJEU. Recently, for 
instance, the Court of Appeal ruled that this specific requirement must be read in 
light of Metock.
23
 In other words, it took the view that the requirement in both the 
CRD and EEA Regulations that extended family members accompany or join 
Union citizens in the host State must be taken to include the situation of relations 
who entered the host State – whether legally or illegally – prior to the Union 
citizen. Finally, on dependency, UK courts are working towards a generous 
construction of that criterion. In Adaleslu the Court of Appeal recently ruled that, 
for extended family members, that requirement must be assessed at the time of 
application.
24
 Further, it also concluded that the situation of dependency need not 
have arisen in the recipient’s country of origin.25 The Court of Appeal’s position 
would appear to extend beyond the requirements outlined by the CJEU in Rahman. 
The Court of Justice had strongly suggested that the situation of dependency on 
the Union citizen in Art 3(2)(a) CRD must have arisen in the extended family 
member’s country of origin.26  
 
 Are the procedural safeguards contained in Article 5 providing effective 
protection? 
 
9. The primary procedural safeguard as regards the right of entry into the host 
State is contained in Art 5(4) CRD. That provision obliges Member States to 
afford Union citizens and their family members ‘every reasonable opportunity’ to 
obtain – or have brought to them within a reasonable period – the necessary 
documentation required to support their right of entry into the host State. 
Alternatively, Member States must permit persons to corroborate or prove by other 
means that they are covered by the right of free movement and residence under 
Union law. The host Member State is expressly prohibited from refusing persons 
entry to the national territory before the aforementioned obligations have been 
discharged. The substance of Art 5(4) is transposed into UK law in Reg 11(4) of 
the EEA Regulations.  
 
10. Reg 11(4) has been invoked to establish, for TCN family members of Union 
citizens, a right of entry into the UK. For instance, in CO (Nigeria) v Entry 
Clearance Officer, the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal held that the son of a 
Polish national resident in the UK could rely on Reg 11(4) in order to secure entry 
into the United Kingdom.
27
 Equally, in Owusu the Court held that a Ghanaian 
minor was entitled to join his Dutch mother resident in the UK on the basis of that 
                                                        
22
 Bigia v Entry Clearance Officer [2009] EWCA Civ 79. In that case, the Secretary of State 
conceded that Art 3(2) CRD had been incorrectly transposed. The EEA Regulations were 
subsequently amended in 2011 by the Immigration (European Economic Area) (Amendment) 
Regulations SI 2011/1247. 
23
 Aladeselu v Secretary of State, cited supra note 7 at paras 39 and 44. 
24
 Ibid., at para. 48. 
25
 Ibid. 
26
 Case C-83/11 Rahman, cited supra note 7 at para. 33. 
27
 CO (Nigeria) v Entry Clearance Officer [2007] UKAIT 74. 
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same provision.
28
 The application of Reg 11(4) to establish rights of entry and 
residence for TCN family members is, however, severely limited in practice by the 
UK’s rules on entry clearance.29 The UK has introduced financial penalties for 
carriers bringing TCN family members to the United Kingdom who have not first 
obtained an ‘EEA family permit’ in accordance with Reg 12 of the EEA 
Regulations.
30
 Thus, in effect, TCN family members without an EEA permit will 
in all likelihood be denied boarding by carriers even though they would be able to 
secure entry upon arrival pursuant to Reg 11(4).  
 
11. The requirement under the EEA Regulations that TCN family members obtain 
a UK-issued ‘EEA family permit’ prior to entering the UK conflicts with Art 5(2) 
CRD. That provision clearly directs Member States to exempt non-EEA family 
members from visa requirements otherwise applicable under national law where 
such persons hold a valid EU residence card issued by the authorities of another 
Member State in accordance with Art 10 CRD. The UK Government’s refusal to 
transpose this obligation is based on concerns about the abuse of rights, fraud and, 
moreover, the current absence of uniform, minimum standards governing the issue 
of CRD residence cards throughout the Union.
31
 In 2011 the European 
Commission concluded that the UK had failed to transpose Art 5(2) CRD 
correctly.
32
 In November 2012, the High Court ruled that the UK’s refusal to 
recognise non-UK issued residence cards in accordance with Art 5(2) CRD was 
justified and proportionate.
33
 Nevertheless, in the final analysis, the Court opted to 
refer the matter to the Court of Justice on a preliminary reference.
34
 The CJEU is 
yet to adjudicate on the validity of the UK’s legal position.35 
 
Question 2 
 
 Is there any evidence of the expulsion of EU citizens (and/or their family 
members) on purely economic grounds (i.e. failure to satisfy the conditions set 
out in Article 7 of the Directive) e.g. in the decisions of national courts and/or 
tribunals? 
 
12. There is clear evidence of targeted administrative efforts to deport EU citizens 
from the UK on grounds that are inherently linked to economic considerations. By 
way of illustration, in April 2010 the UKBA introduced a pilot scheme aimed at 
removing homeless EEA nationals from the United Kingdom.
36
 The scheme ran in 
parts of London as well as in several other cities in the South of England. The 
Homelessness Pilot project involved UKBA officials issuing written notices to EU 
                                                        
28
R. (on the application of Owusu) v Secretary of State, cited supra note 15. 
29
 See here also Shaw et al, ‘Getting to grips with EU citizenship,’ cited supra note 7 at p. 10. 
30
 Art 1(2) of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 (Section 40) indicates that liability may be 
waivered if the person concerned is able to satisfy the conditions in Reg 11(4) EEA Regulations 
upon arrival. 
31
 See here esp. R (on the application of McCarthy) v SSHD [2012] EWHC 3368 (Admin) at paras 
41-57. 
32
 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-417_en..htm. 
33
 R (on the application of McCarthy) v SSHD, cited supra note 30 at para 108. 
34
 Ibid., at para. 112. 
35
 Case C-202/13. 
36
 For discussion, see Shaw et al, ‘Getting to grips with EU citizenship,’ cited supra note 7 at pp 
31-32. 
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citizens requiring them to attend a local police station for interview. The purpose 
of this hearing was to determine whether the EU citizen concerned had a right of 
residence in the UK under the CRD (e.g. by virtue of Arts 7 or 16 CRD). The 
Guardian reported in July 2010 that, one month into the Homelessness Pilot 
project, more than 200 people had been targeted under the pilot, with around 100 
EU citizens served removal notices and 13 deported.
37
  
 
13. A recent report in Inside Housing indicates that the UKBA has revived its 
removal scheme.
38
 As of July 2013, it is reported that Metropolitan Police and UK 
Immigration officers have again targeted homeless EU citizens in London. Inside 
Housing reports that 63 Romanian nationals were questioned near Marble Arch, 
around 20 of who were subsequently deported by plane to Romania. An official 
statement by the Head of the Home Office Immigration Enforcement Team, 
confirmed that a number of ‘immigration offenders from Eastern Europe’ were 
targeted in the July action on the grounds that they did not enjoy a right of 
residence in the UK under Union law.
39
 
 
14. UK courts and tribunals are only very exceptionally confronted with the issue 
of removing EU citizens from the UK on grounds that are purely economic.
40
 
Most of the national case law on deportation addresses the existence of CRD 
residence rights or the interpretation of the concepts of public policy, public 
security and public health protecting EU citizens from expulsion from the host 
State.
41
 On the issue of residence rights (point one), national courts frequently 
conclude that EU citizens and/or their family members do not enjoy a right of 
residence under EU law for want of sufficient resources (Art 7 CRD).
42
 However, 
that determination does not, of itself, lead in law or practice to the deportation of 
Member State nationals. The solution adopted by the UK courts is to treat EU 
citizens who do not enjoy a right of residence by virtue of e.g. Art 7 CRD as 
simply ‘present’ in the United Kingdom.43 That status does not confer any right of 
residence in the UK under either EU or national law. Such persons are deemed 
subject to UK immigration control and, therefore, liable to removal by the 
Secretary of State.
44
 The preceding discussion of the UKBA’s schemes to remove 
EU citizen confirms that such follow-on administrative action is now being taken 
– at least with respect to specific categories of non-economically active EU 
citizens. 
 
 
 
                                                        
37
 http://www.theguardian.com/society/2010/jul/20/eastern-european-rough-sleepers-deported. 
38
 http://www.insidehousing.co.uk//6527844.article. 
39
 Ibid. 
40
 See here Chief Adjudication Officer v Wolke (HL) [1997] 1 WLR 1640. 
41
 See further Q6 below. 
42
 E.g. Lekpo-Bozua v Hackney LBC [2010] EWCA Civ 909 and Mirga v Secretary of State for 
Work and Pensions [2012] EWCA Civ 1952. The sufficient resources test is transposed in Reg 4(4) 
EEA Regulations.  
43
Kaczmarek v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2008] EWCA Civ 1310. See here also 
Abdirahman v Secretary of State [2007] EWCA Civ 657. 
44
As per Maurice Kay LJ, Kaczmarek v Secretary of State, cited supra note 41 at para. 5. See here 
also Lord Hoffmann in Chief Adjudication Officer v Wolke, cited supra note 38 at p.1656. 
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Question 3 
 
 How have Articles 12-15 of the Directive been transposed into national law? 
 
15. Art 12 and 13 CRD provide for the retention of residence rights, under certain 
conditions, by family members of a Union citizen following the death or departure 
from the host Member State of that citizen, or after the termination of a marriage 
or registered partnership. These provisions have been transposed into UK law by 
Reg 10(2), (3), and (5) of the EEA Regulations. Art 14 CRD places conditions on 
both the individual and the host State in relation to the retention of residence under 
Articles 6, 7, 12 and 13 CRD. These broadly relate to conditions of work or self-
sufficiency.
45
 Art 14 is transposed to a greater extent by Regs 14, 13(3), 19(4) and 
(6)(2)(b)(iii) of the EEA Regulations. Art 15 CRD affords Union citizens and their 
family members a range of procedural safeguards; e.g. protection from expulsion 
upon the expiry of identity documents and a right of appeal against expulsion 
decisions. These provisions are partly transposed by Regs 26, 27, 29 and 29A of 
the EEA Regulations. The Commission has identified specific problems with the 
UK’s transposition of the rights of appeal related to Art 15 CRD – discussed 
below.
46
 
 
 Have any disputes on the interpretation or application been addressed within 
the national courts and tribunals? 
 
16. Much of the national case law in relation to Arts 12 and 13 CRD has 
concerned the economic status required of both the Union citizen and his/her 
(former) family members for residence rights to be retained, following death, 
departure or termination of marriage/registered partnership. In short, UK courts 
have largely held that, for family members to retain residence rights, the Union 
citizen, from whom rights are derived, must have been working, self-sufficient or 
self-employed up until the point of death, departure or divorce.
47
 This requirement 
has been held to apply even in relation to Art 13(2)(c) CRD under which spouses 
can retain a right of residence, without meeting requirements as to length of 
residence attached to other parts of the provision, in particularly difficult 
circumstances such as domestic violence.  
 
17. The economic status of the Union citizen, from whom rights were originally 
derived, is considered irrelevant after the date of death, departure or divorce.
48
 At 
this point, the focus shifts to the economic status of the (former) family member. 
UK courts have held that, from the date of death, departure, or divorce, family 
members must themselves become employed, self-employed or self-sufficient in 
order to retain derived residence rights under Union law. This requirement is 
                                                        
45
The initial right of residence, residence for more than three months, and the retention of residence 
respectively.  
46
 COM (2008) 840, p.9. These issues are yet to be addressed by the UK.   
47
 Amos v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] EWCA Civ 552 and Ahmed v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] UKUT 00089 (IAC). C.f. Samsam v The 
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] UKUT 00165 (IAC).  
48
 Amos, cited supra note 47. Reasoned by reference to the fact that such a requirement would be 
impossible under Art 12 CRD, which can relate to the death of the Union citizen, and the similarity 
of the wording of Art 13 CRD.   
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applied to both Union citizen family members
49
 and TCN family members
50
 who 
retain rights under Arts 12 and 13 CRD. However, in one Upper Tribunal decision, 
it was held that a TCN who had obtained a retained right of residence following 
divorce did not lose that right if he subsequently ceased to be employed or self-
employed.
51
 Finally, national courts have held that a condition of employment, 
self-employment or self-sufficiency on the part of the family member does not 
attach to Art 12(3) CRD, which concerns the retention of residence due to a child’s 
enrolment at an educational establishment in the host State.
52
  
 
18. In other developments, UK courts have confirmed that the rights conferred on 
TCNs under Art 13 CRD apply only to the dissolution of marriages/civil 
partnerships and not with respect to durable relationships.
53
 On the termination of 
marriages/civil partnerships, national courts have followed established principles 
of EU law by confirming that legal, rather than factual termination is required for 
this provision to give rise to retained residence rights.
54
  
 
19. With respect to Art 15 CRD, we identified a problem with access to appeal 
rights for family members in specific instances. The UK presently imposes a 
requirement that family members produce evidence that they are, inter alia, indeed 
family members of an EEA national before they are granted a right to appeal.
55
 
Ordinarily, this precondition is unproblematic, e.g. in cases where a family 
member is facing deportation on grounds of public policy, public security and 
public health. However, in certain instances, an individual may be subject to a 
deportation order following an administrative decision finding that they are not 
family members for the purposes of the CRD.
56
 In such circumstances, the 
requirement to adduce proof of the appellant’s status as a family member is the 
very basis of the substantive appeal. The European Commission has highlighted 
this approach to appeal rights under the EEA Regulations as a matter of concern.
57
 
 
Question 4 
 
 How have Articles 16-21 been transposed into national law? 
  
19. Arts 16-18 CRD outline the conditions for the acquisition of the right of 
permanent residence by Union citizens and their family members. The basic right 
is set out in Art 16 CRD and confers a right of permanent residence to Union 
citizens and their family members who have resided legally in the host State for a 
continuous period of five years. Arts 17 and 18 CRD address the acquisition of the 
right of permanent residence by Union citizens and/or their family members in 
specific circumstances, e.g. following the Union citizen’s retirement, or on the 
                                                        
49
 Okafor v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] EWCA Civ 499, para.8 
50
 Amos, through a combined reading of both paragraphs of Art 13.2 CRD. cited supra note 47.  
51
 Samsam, cited supra note 47.   
52
 Okafor, cited supra note 49 at para.8. 
53
 CS (Brazil) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] EWCA Civ 480.  
54
 Ahmed. Supra note 47, based on a combined reading of both paragraphs of Art 13.2 CRD.  
55
 Reg 26(3) EEA Regulations. 
56
 See e.g. The Queen on the Application of AH (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, Asylum and Immigration Tribunal [2009] EWHC 1771 (Admin). 
57
 COM(2008) 840, p.9. These issues are yet to be addressed by the UK.   
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basis of residence rights retained under Arts 12 and 13 CRD. The substance of 
Arts 16-18 CRD is transposed principally by Reg 15 of the EEA Regulations. Arts 
19-21 CRD require Member States to issue Union citizens and their family 
members entitled to permanent residence with certifying documents and impose 
conditions on the issue and renewal of such documents. Arts 19-21 CRD are 
transposed into UK law by Reg 18 of the EEA Regulations. 
 
 Has data on the volume of applications to date for the status of permanent 
residence been published for your Member State?  
 
20. The UK Home Office has published data on the issue and refusal of residence 
documentation to EU citizens (as ‘EEA nationals’) and their family members.58 
See below table:   
 
Year Recognition of 
permanent 
residence - 
issued 
Recognition of 
permanent 
residence - 
refused 
Recognition of 
permanent 
residence - 
invalid 
application 
2006 8777 1775 16 
2007 7623 1455 4 
2008 4020 1038 8 
2009 11379 1726 7 
2010 20157 3748 0 
2011 21159 1999 5222 
2012 15197 2332 9568 
 
21. According to the Home Office, the generally rising number of applications 
made between 2007 and 2011 might reflect an increase in the number of eligible 
EU citizens who had been living in the UK in accordance with the CRD for the 5-
year period required under Art 16 CRD.
59
 The statistics record a fall in decisions 
recognising permanent residence in 2012 – across most nationalities. However, 
there was a notable rise in relation to Bulgarian and Romanian nationals in 2012, 
although the Home Office indicates that the ‘numbers remain low'.60 In the same 
year, there was also an increase in the numbers refused recognition of permanent 
residence (2,332, up 17%). Perhaps most notably, since 2011 there has been a 
large increase in the number of ‘invalid’ applications. This likely follows from a 
change in Government policy in 2011. Applications are now deemed invalid 
during a ‘pre-application’ sifting process in instances where key information 
and/or supporting documentation is missing/incomplete. Immediate re-application 
                                                        
58
 The Home Office considers the quality of these statistics to be ‘high’. For information on how 
those statistics are compiled and their quality controlled, see: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/immigration-statistics-january-to-march-
2013/immigration-statistics-january-to-march-2013#european-economic-area-eea, in particular, 
para.14.7 and 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/200531/user-guide-
immig-statistics.pdf. 
59
 Ibid. 
60
 Issues to Bulgarians: 13 in 2011, 1067 in 2012; Romanians: 24 in 2011; 1110 in 2012.  
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may follow rejected or invalid applications. Re-applications are included in the 
above statistics.  
 
22. Following the most recent amendment to the EEA Regulations in 2013,
61
 there 
is now a processing and consideration fee of £55 per person to apply for a 
document certifying permanent residence/a permanent residence card, payable 
regardless of the outcome.   
 
 Have any disputes on the interpretation or application of these provisions been 
addressed within national courts or tribunals? 
 
23. The two principal issues in the national case law on Arts 16-21 CRD have 
addressed: 1) the definition of “legal” residence for the purposes of acquiring a 
permanent right of residence; and 2) the impact of imprisonment on the accrual of 
the years of residence necessary to attain a permanent right of residence.  
 
 The definition of “legal” residence 
 
24. UK courts consistently interpret the requirement for ‘legal’ residence in Art 16 
CRD to mean residence in accordance with the CRD.
62
 Under the terms of the 
EEA Regulations, Union citizens must therefore be resident in the UK as 
‘qualified persons’ i.e. as a worker, or self-employed/self-sufficient person in 
order for residence to be legal. TCN family members also have to reside in the UK 
with ‘qualified persons’. Residence that does not accord with the terms of the 
CRD, but which is lawful by virtue of UK nationality,
63
 or because no steps have 
been taken by national authorities to remove an individual,
64
 will not constitute 
‘legal’ residence for the purposes of Art 16 CRD. Moreover, residence that is 
lawful under other provisions of Union law, rather than the CRD, whether 
secondary
65
 or primary law,
66
 will not meet the requirements of Art 16. The 
approach of national courts on this point is in line with the UK’s approach to the 
implementation of EU citizens’ rights beyond the scope of the CRD (see Part 2 of 
this Report). The EEA Regulations clearly stipulate that the rights of residence 
arising from the Court of Justice’s decisions in Chen, Texeira and Ibrahim, and 
Ruiz Zambrano 
67
 do not qualify as ‘legal’ for the purposes of acquiring a right to 
permanent residence under Art 16 CRD. 
                                                        
61
 The Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations, SI 2013/1391, s.2. 
62
 Reasoned by reading Art 16 CRD in combination with Recital 17, this interpretation reduces the 
potential for conflict between the CRD and Reg 15, which requires residence ‘in accordance with 
these regulations’.  
63
 McCarthy [2008] EWCA Civ 641.  
64 
Lepko-Bozua v London Borough of Hackney [2010] EWCA Civ 909; Okafor, cited supra note 
49. The UK courts consider Union residents residing in the UK but not meeting the requirements of 
the CRD to be ‘lawfully present’ but without a ‘right to reside.’  
65
 E.g. Art 12 of Regulation 1612/68. See Okafor [2011] EWCA Civ 499, citing McCarthy, cited 
supra note 63 and Dias v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] EWCA Civ 807; 
MDB [2010] UKUT 161 (IAC). The national courts often refer to the Court of Justice’s decision in 
Case C-325/09 Dias [2011] ECR I-06387 when using this approach.   
66
 On Arts 20/21 TFEU: Lepko-Bozua, cited supra note 64 and Abdirahman, cited supra note 43.   
Incidentally, Art 12(3) CRD also does not confer a right to permanent residence. 
67
 See Q7. Case C-200/02 Zhu and Chen v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] 
ECR I-9925; Case C-480/08 Teixeira v London Borough of Lambeth and Secretary of State for the 
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25. At times, national courts have taken a strict approach to whether residence 
purported to be in accordance with the CRD in fact meets its requirements. For 
instance, a permanent residence claim based on five years’ self-sufficient 
residence in the UK was rejected on the basis that the applicant’s sickness 
insurance complemented rather than replaced all services provided by the UK’s 
publicly-funded National Health Service. The applicant had not been truly self-
sufficient and so her residence had not been ‘legal’ under the CRD for the 
purposes of enjoying a permanent right of residence.
68
 On the other hand, the 
national courts have recognised a number of situations as falling within Art 16 
‘legal’ residence, in accordance with decisions of the Court of Justice. Thus, 
residence occurring before the coming into effect of the CRD
69
 but which would 
have been in accordance with its terms constitutes ‘legal’ residence for the 
purposes of Art 16.
70
 It is also recognised that spouses who derive residence rights 
from a working or self-sufficient Union citizen do not have to live in the 
matrimonial home with that Union citizen in order for the residence to be ‘legal’ 
under Art 16.
71
  
 
 Imprisonment and periods of “lawful” residence under the CRD 
 
26. Until recently, national courts had consistently held that time spent in prison 
does not constitute ‘legal’ residence for the purposes of attaining a right to 
permanent residence under Art 16 CRD. To support this conclusion, UK courts 
had referred to: 1) the integrative objectives of the CRD and the belief that these 
cannot be met whilst in prison;
72
 2) the fact that ‘legal’ residence requires an 
individual to be a worker, self-sufficient, or self-employed
73
 and that Art 7 CRD 
does not include imprisonment when listing situations in which a person retains 
worker status;
74
 and 3) a Commission Communication which stated that, as a rule, 
Member States are not obliged to take time spent in prison into account when 
calculating periods of legal residence in a host State.
75
 Nevertheless, the Upper 
Tribunal in Onuekwere
76
 recently referred the question of whether, and in what 
                                                                                                                                                        
Home Department [2010] ECR I-01107; Case C-310/08 London Borough of Harrow v Nimco 
Hassan Ibrahim and the Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] ECR I-01065; and 
Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano v ONEM [2011] ECR I-01177. Reg 15A, EEA Regulations.  
68
 FK (Kenya) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] EWCA Civ 1302, see, in 
particular, para.15 per Sullivan LJ. The UK’s refusal to view NHS provision as ‘sufficient medical 
insurance’ in relation to Union citizens is currently the subject of infringement proceedings brought 
by the European Commission before the Court of Justice: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-
12-417_en.htm. 
69
 In other words, before 30
th
 April 2006.  
70
 LG and CC (Italy) [2009] UKAIT] 00024, departing from OP (Columbia) v Secretary of State 
for the Home Department [2008] UKAIT 74, following Case C-162/09 Secretary of State for Work 
and Pensions v Taous Lassal [2010] ECR I-09217. See also Secretary of State for the Home 
Department v FV (Italy) [2012] EWCA Civ 1199. This approach also applies to Art 17 CRD, see 
RM (Zimbabwe) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] EWCA Civ 775, particularly 
the judgment of Lady Justice Gloster at para.38, also following Lassal. 
71
 PM (Turkey) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] UKUT 89 (IAC). 
72
 HB [2008] EWCA Civ 806, Consider the judgment of Buxton LJ at para.9.  
73
 Jarusevicius v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] UKUT 120 (IAC). 
74
 C v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] EWCA Civ 1406, para. 27, per Maurice 
Kay LJ. 
75
 Ibid., at para.25. COM (2009) 313 final, 2 July 2009. 
76
 [2012] UKUT 269 (IAC). 
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circumstances, a period of imprisonment may constitute legal residence, for the 
purposes of the acquisition of an Art 16 CRD right to permanent residence, to the 
Court of Justice.
77
 This preliminary reference is currently pending. 
 
27. National courts have also had to consider whether periods of imprisonment 
break the continuity of legal residence required in order to enjoy a permanent right 
of residence under Art 16 CRD. In other words, does an individual have to begin 
accruing years of legal residence afresh, from zero, upon his/her release from 
prison? The national courts had previously answered this question in the 
affirmative: an individual cannot aggregate periods of legal residence before and 
after imprisonment to accumulate 5 years’ legal residence under Art 16 CRD.78 
However, following the Court of Justice’s Tsakouridis 79  judgment, the Upper 
Tribunal recently considered it necessary to refer the matter to the Court of Justice 
for a preliminary ruling.
80
 What is already clear to national courts is that, once 
acquired, a right of permanent residence under the CRD cannot be lost even by 
significant periods of imprisonment.
81
  
 
Question 5 
 
 How has Article 24(2) of the Directive been transposed into national law? 
 
28. Art 24(2) CRD makes provision for Member States to restrict the entitlement 
of EU citizens to social assistance benefits. Under that provision, Member States 
are not obliged to provide social assistance to EU citizens residing in accordance 
with the right of residence for up to three months (Art 6 CRD). Member States are 
also not obliged to grant social assistance to EU citizens enjoying a right of 
residence in the host State as 'workseekers' for the longer period of residence 
pursuant to Art 14(4)(b) CRD. With respect to maintenance aid for studies, 
including vocational training, consisting in student grants or student loans, Art 
24(2) CRD permits Member States to exclude the payment of such benefits to 
economically inactive EU citizens prior to their acquisition of the right of 
permanent residence. 
 
29. Art 24(2) CRD – together with the positive statement on equal treatment 
contained in Art 24(1) CRD – is not transposed by the EEA Regulations. The 
substance of that provision is instead given effect in UK law through a series of 
statutory amendments to existing UK legislation on social security/student 
maintenance. The legal framework governing social security, in particular, has 
been accurately described as 'labyrinthine' and subject to repeated amendment.
82
  
                                                        
77
 Case C-378/12.
  
78
 LG and CC (Italy), cited supra note 70 and C v Secretary of State for the Home Department, 
cited supra note 74 at para. 36. 
79
 Case C-145/09 Tsakouridis, 23
rd
 November 2010. 
80
Onuekwere, cited supra note 76; see also Jarusevicius, cited supra note 73, although a 
preliminary reference was considered unnecessary in that case, on the facts.   
81
 FV (Italy), cited supra note 70. The Court of Appeal held that loss of a permanent right of 
residence for this reason would be inconsistent with Tsakouridis, cited supra note 79. Case C-
348/09 PI, 22
nd
 May 2012, and Art 16(4) CRD.   
82
 Maurice Kay LJ, Kaczmarek v Secretary of State, cited supra note 41 at para. 5. 
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The following paragraphs offer a summary of key UK provisions and judicial 
decisions of relevance to this question. 
 
 Social Assistance  
 
30. In the social assistance context, the Social Security (Persons from Abroad) 
Amendment Regulations 2006 (hereinafter: Social Security Regulations) is the 
most comprehensive attempt to transpose the substance of Art 24(2) CRD.
83
 That 
Regulation entered into force on the same date as the CRD (30th April 2006). As 
the Explanatory Note indicates, its amending provisions were made 'in 
consequence of' the enactment of the Citizens’ Directive with the purpose of 
modifying the criterion for entitlement to specific social benefits 'to take account 
of Article 24(2) CRD.'
84
  
 
31. Briefly summarised, the Social Security Regulations introduce a new 
eligibility test for EEA nationals seeking to claim Income Support; Jobseeker's 
Allowance; Housing Benefit; Council Tax Benefit; and State Pension Credit. That 
same test also now governs entitlement to other benefits, such as Employment and 
Support Allowance – regulated separately. 85  In short, EEA nationals are now 
required to establish a 'right to reside' under EU law in order to secure access to 
the aforementioned range of UK social assistance benefits. EU citizens must 
demonstrate that they enjoy a right of residence under Union law as a worker (or 
person retaining this status pursuant to Art 7(3) CRD); self-employed migrant; or 
EU citizen with permanent residence (Art 16 CRD). The introduction of the right 
to reside test introduces an important difference in treatment between EEA 
nationals and UK (and Irish) citizens with respect to social assistance entitlement. 
For the latter category of persons, eligibility continues to be determined 
exclusively by the ‘habitual residence’ test.86 That test was introduced into the UK 
legal framework on social security benefits in 1994. Prior to the adoption of the 
EEA Regulations, the habitual residence test governed entitlement for both EEA 
nationals and UK citizens.  
 
32. The UK’s right to reside test has given rise to a considerable body of case law 
before national courts and tribunals. In summary, legal disputes address three 
distinct issues. First, EU citizens have sought to contest administrative decisions 
finding that they do not qualify as 'EU workers' or 'persons retaining EU worker 
status' pursuant to Art 7(3) CRD
87
 and are, therefore, not entitled to social 
assistance. Secondly, national courts and tribunals have been requested to 
adjudicate on whether EU citizens failing the 'right to reside' test enjoy a right of 
residence in the UK under primary EU law (Art 21 TFEU). The existence of such 
a right is highly significant in the social assistance context. It would make it 
                                                        
83
 SI 2006/1026. 
84
 Ibid., at p.15. 
85
 The Employment and Support Allowance Regulations SI 2008/794, Reg 70. 
86
 For an overview of the habitual residence test, see e.g. ‘The Habitual Residence Test - Commons 
Library Standard Note,’ 2011 SN/SP/416 available at: http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-
papers/SN00416  
87
 E.g. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions v Elmi [2008] EWCA Civ 1403; R. (on the 
application of Tilianu) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2010] EWCA Civ 1397; and 
Jessy ST Prix v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions  [2011] EWCA Civ 806.  
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possible for EU citizens who are unable to satisfy the right to reside test to assert a 
right to equal treatment with respect to social assistance benefits on the basis of 
Art 18 TFEU.
88
 Thirdly, direct challenges have been made to the legality of the 
right to reside test itself. In several recent cases, EU claimants have argued 
unsuccessfully that the right to reside test is discriminatory, contrary to both EU 
and UK law.
 89
 As noted above, that test is applied only to EEA nationals whereas 
UK nationals are simply required to demonstrate that they are habitually resident 
in the United Kingdom.   
 
33. In 2013 the European Commission commenced infringement proceedings 
against the United Kingdom with respect to its introduction of the right to reside 
test to govern entitlement to social benefits falling within the scope of Regulation 
883/2004.
90
 According to the Commission, the right to reside test is indirectly 
discriminatory and, further, cannot be justified under EU law. It maintains that 
entitlement to the applicable social security benefits should be determined, for 
both UK nationals and EU citizens, under the same habitual residence test (as was 
the case before 30
th
 April 2006). The UK Government has made its position clear 
that it does not intend to alter the current legal framework, which it also considers 
lawful.
91
  
 
 Student Maintenance 
 
34. Separate instruments regulate entitlement to student maintenance within the 
United Kingdom.
92
 This reflects that fact that competence to regulate student 
support is devolved to the Northern Irish, Scottish and Welsh administrations.  
 
35. The provisions on student maintenance applicable within England, Scotland, 
Northern Ireland, and Wales adopt a broadly common approach with respect to EU 
citizens. In line with Art 24(2) CRD, all four sets of rules restrict entitlement to 
student maintenance for EU citizens who do not qualify as workers, self-employed 
persons or the family members of such persons. Non-economically active EU 
citizens must satisfy a minimum period of three years residence in order to access 
student maintenance and other grants.
93
 An additional criterion also applies where 
                                                        
88
 See e.g. Abdirahman v Secretary of State, cited supra note 41. 
89
E.g. Kaczmarek v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2008] EWCA Civ 1310; 
Patmalniece (FC) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2011] UKSC 11. 
90
 See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-475_en.htm. Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the coordination of social security 
systems [2004] OJ L 166/1.  
91
 See e.g. http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/may/30/uk-government-eu-migrant-benefits.  
92
 For England, see: The Education (Student Support) Regulations, SI 2011/1986; for Scotland, see: 
The Education (Student Loans) (Scotland) Regulations, SI 2007/154; for Northern Ireland, see: The 
Education (Student Support) (No.2) Regulations (Northern Ireland) SI 2009/373; and for Wales, 
see: The Education (Student Support) (Wales) Regulations, SI 2012/3097. For a summary of the 
categories and conditions of entitlement, see: http://www.ukcisa.org.uk/International-
Students/Fees--finance/Student-support/Applying-in-England/Who-is-eligible/#Category-2:-
European-Union-nationals-and-family-living-in-the-European-Economic-Area-and-Switzerland. 
93
 The Education (Student Support) Regulations, cited supra at note 90, Schedule 1, Part 2, S.10; 
the Education (Student Loans) (Scotland) Regulations, cited supra at note 90, Schedule 1, S.8; The 
Education (Student Support) (No.2) Regulations (Northern Ireland), cited supra at note 90, 
Schedule 1, Part 2, S.10; and the Education (Student Support) (Wales) Regulations, cited supra at 
note 90, Schedule 1, Part 2, S.10. 
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the period of qualifying residence was completed primarily for the purposes of 
receiving full-time education. In such instances, the applicant must demonstrate 
that he/she was ordinarily resident within the EEA immediately prior to the period 
of residence in the UK completed for the purposes of receiving full-time 
education.  
 
36. All four sets of rules on student maintenance expressly exclude British 
nationals who have not exercised their rights of intra-EU movement under the 
Treaty from relying on their status as Union citizens in order to establish 
entitlement to equal treatment.
94
 This exclusion is particularly significant in light 
of the considerable differences in entitlements available across England, Scotland 
and Wales.  
 
 Does national law distinguish between the categories specified in Article 24(2) 
and job-seekers in terms of entitlement to social benefits? 
 
37. UK law recognises the specific position of EU citizens as job-seekers as 
regards entitlement to social benefits. On the one hand, job-seekers are expressly 
excluded from the categories of EEA nationals capable of establishing a right to 
reside under the Social Security Regulations. This exclusion applies to the 
following key social benefits: Council Tax Benefit; Housing Benefit; Income 
Support; and Pension Credit. On the other hand, job-seekers are entitled to claim 
Jobseeker's Allowance - provided that they are able to satisfy the 'habitual 
residence' test in Art 85A of the Jobseeker's Allowance Regulations 1996. The 
habitual residence test applies to both EEA nationals and UK citizens. 
 
38. The inclusion of job-seekers as persons entitled to claim Jobseeker's 
Allowance (subject to the habitual residence test) follows the Court of Justice’s 
decision in Collins.
95
 In that case – on reference from the Court of Appeal – the 
CJEU concluded that Member State nationals are entitled, as workseekers, to equal 
treatment with UK nationals as regards financial benefits intended to facilitate 
access to employment in that State. However, the Court also accepted that it was 
legitimate for Member States to restrict the payment of such benefits to EU 
national job-seekers who are able to demonstrate a 'genuine link' to the 
employment market of that State.
96
 In that connection, the CJEU concluded that a 
residence requirement, such as the UK’s habitual residence test, could function as 
an appropriate tool to ensure that such a connection is established.
97
 On the 
strength of the CJEU’s decision, the Court of Appeal subsequently upheld the 
validity of the UK’s habitual residence test as justified in EU law.98  
 
                                                        
94
 The Education (Student Support) Regulations, cited supra at note 90, Schedule 1, Part 2, S. 
10(1)(a); The Education (Student Loans) (Scotland) Regulations, cited supra at note 90, Schedule 1 
S.8(a); The Education (Student Support) (No.2) Regulations (Northern Ireland), cited supra at note 
90, Schedule 1, Part 2, S. 10(1)(a); and The Education (Student Support) (Wales) Regulations, 
cited supra at note 90, Schedule 1, Part 2, S.10(1)(a). 
95
 Case C-138/02 Collins v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2004] ECR I-2703. See 
thereafter e.g. Joined Cases C-22/08 and C-23/08 Vatsouras and Koupatantze [2009] ECR I-4585. 
96
 Case C-138/02 Collins, cited supra note 94 at para. 67. 
97
Ibid., at paras 69-72. 
98
 Collins v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2006] EWCA Civ 376. 
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39. EU citizens who are able to satisfy the habitual residence test and, therefore, 
secure UK Jobseeker's Allowance may be passported subsequently to two 
additional categories of social assistance. Under the Social Security Regulations, 
recipients of Jobseeker's Allowance qualify as persons with a 'right to reside' for 
the purposes of entitlement to Housing and Council Tax Benefit.
99
   
 
 Has Article 24(2) displaced the Court of Justice’s ‘real link’ case law before 
national courts or tribunals? 
 
40. Art 24(2) CRD has not displaced the Court of Justice’s ‘real link’ test before 
UK courts and tribunals in the social assistance context.
100
 National courts 
continue to fall back on the ‘real link’ criterion as the primary legal basis to 
support the exclusion of certain EU citizens from the categories of persons entitled 
to claim UK social assistance benefits. The recent Supreme Court decision in 
Patmalniece upholding the validity of the UK’s right to reside test illustrates this 
point clearly.
101
 In Patmalniece, the Supreme Court also made an important 
connection between the real link test and Member State concerns about the 
phenomenon of ‘social tourism.’102 The purpose of the real link test, it was argued, 
was to protect the UK’s resources against social tourism on the basis of the 
principle that entitlement is based directly on the claimant’s degree of economic 
and social integration in the UK.
103
 We suggest that the fact Art 24(2) CRD is yet 
to take hold as a legislative alternative to the real link test may be linked to the UK 
Government’s decision not to transpose that provision directly in the EEA 
Regulations. 
 
Question 6 
 
 How have Articles 27 and 28 of Directive 2004/38 been transposed into 
national law? 
 
41. Arts 27 and 28 CRD permit the Member States to restrict the freedom of 
movement and residence of Union citizens and their family members, regardless 
of their nationality, subject to various conditions. Relevant individuals can only be 
refused admittance, or deported, on grounds of public policy, public health and 
public security. ‘Serious grounds of public policy or public security’ are required 
for those enjoying a permanent right of residence, while those who have resided in 
the host State for ten years can only be expelled on ‘imperative grounds of public 
security’. The national courts have consistently applied this increasingly stringent 
                                                        
99
 See Reg 10(3)(b)(k) of The Housing Benefit Regulations, SI 2006/213 and Reg 7(4A)(k) of The 
Council Tax Benefit Regulations, SI 2006/215. 
100
 On the real link test, see e.g. Case C-224/98 D’Hoop [2002] ECR I-6191 at para. 38 and Case 
C-138/02 Collins, cited supra note 94 at para. 67. 
101
 Patmalniece (FC) v Secretary of State, cited supra at note 87. See also earlier e.g. Kaczmarek v 
Secretary of State, cited supra note 41. 
102
 To support their conclusions, UK courts attach particular authority to the decision in Case C-
456/02 Trojani [2004] ECR I-7573.  
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hierarchy of protection based on duration of residence
104
 and refer to the different 
levels of protection described above using the shorthand of ‘level one’, ‘level two’ 
and ‘level three’ protection respectively.105 This Report will adopt the shorthand 
distinction of level one to three protection developed by UK courts. 
 
42. Whatever the level of protection, restrictions on free movement are subject to 
the condition that the individual represents a genuine, present and sufficiently 
serious threat to a fundamental interest of society, the principle of proportionality, 
and to factors such as, inter alia, the individual’s age, family and economic 
situation, social and cultural integration in the host State, and the extent of his/her 
links with the Member State of origin. Transposition into UK law is by way of 
Regs 19, 20(6) 21(2)-21(6) of the EEA Regulations.   
 
 Please describe how national courts and tribunals have understood, applied 
and differentiated between the concepts of “public policy, public security or 
public health” (Art 27 CRD), “serious grounds of public policy or public 
security” and “imperative grounds of public security” (Art 28 CRD) 
 
43. National case law relating to which level of protection applies has principally 
concerned how to calculate duration of residence. In differentiating between the 
levels of protection the national courts have frequently been tasked with 
determining the type of conduct that falls within each level.  
 
 Application: calculating the duration of residence  
 
44. Deportation decisions usually follow a period of imprisonment. Appellants 
against such decisions often argue that they enjoy a permanent right of residence 
and therefore level two protection. However, this will often depend on whether 
time spent in prison constitutes the ‘legal’ residence required for the attainment of 
a permanent right of residence and/or whether any legal residence accrued before a 
custodial sentence is lost upon entering prison. Discussed in Q4 above, this issue is 
currently the subject of a reference to the Court of Justice for a preliminary 
ruling
106
 and will not be discussed further here. The national courts have held that 
residence must also be ‘legal’ for level three protection to apply although there is 
no reference to this in Art 28(3) CRD/Reg 21(4) EEA Regulations.
107
       
 
45. Reg 21(4)(a) of the EEA Regulations bestows level three protection upon those 
who have resided in the UK for ten years prior to the deportation order. The 
national courts have interpreted this as requiring them to count backwards from 
the date of deportation order, as opposed to forwards from the commencement of 
legal residence as one would with level two protection.
108
 This is significant 
                                                        
104
 See e.g., NYK [2013] CSOH 84; A, B, C v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] 
EWHC 1272 (Admin); and VP v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] EWCA Civ 
806. 
105
 LG (Italy) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] EWCA Civ 190. 
106
 Onuekwere, cited supra note 76. 
107
 HR (Portugal) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] EWCA Civ 371. Applied 
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because, if level three protection requires ‘legal’ residence, and periods of 
imprisonment do not constitute such residence, a person who has lived in the UK 
for decades will never enjoy level three protection if a deportation order is made 
after a custodial sentence.
109
 However, in MG,
110
 the Upper Tribunal considered 
that both the methodology of counting backwards from the deportation order and 
the rule that Art 28(3) CRD required ten years legal residence to be open to 
question in light of the purposes of the Directive and the recent decisions of the 
Court of Justice in Tsakouridis and PI.
111
 Consequently, a reference was made to 
the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling for clarification.
112
 Shortly after MG, 
however, the Court of Appeal decided FV,
113
 in which it held that, following 
Tsakouridis and PI, the test in relation to the acquisition of level three protection 
should involve a qualitative assessment of the level of integration of the 
individual, under which time spent in prison was only a factor.
114
 The key 
question, it concluded, was whether ‘integrating links’ forged with the UK had 
been broken. The Court of Appeal also considered that the loss of protection 
acquired after ten years’ legal residence caused by counting backwards from a 
deportation order would be inconsistent with the Court of justice’s approach to the 
facts of PI.
115
      
 
46. At the administrative level, a lack of consistency as to whether a person will be 
considered to have resided in the UK for past ten years, despite a period of 
imprisonment prior to the deportation order, has led to a ‘luck of the draw’ 
application of level three protection.
116
 
 
 Application: the principle of proportionality; the consideration of 
factors such as how long the individual concerned has resided in the 
territory, his/her age, state of health, family and economic situation, 
social and cultural integration into the host Member State and the 
extent of his/her links with the country of origin.  
  
47. In practice, the principle of proportionality contained in Art 27(2) CRD/Reg 
21(5)(a) of the EEA Regulations overlaps with the condition that an individual 
represents a genuine, present, and sufficiently serious threat to a fundamental 
interest of society
117
 and the requirement to consider factors such as, inter alia, the 
individual’s age, family and economic situation or links with his/her Member State 
                                                        
109
 Although Art 28(3) CRD implies a similar approach by referring to the ‘previous’ ten years, the 
issue is all the more acute under the EEA Regulations, which requires ten years’ continuous 
residence prior to the deportation order.    
110
 Secretary of State for the Home Department v MG (Portugal) [2012] UKUT 268 (IAC). 
111
 Cited supra notes 79 and 81. Also by reference to Recitals 23 and 24 of the CRD and the 
Common Position (EC) No 6/2004, adopted by Council on 5 December 2003. See also LG and CC, 
cited, supra note 70. 
112
 Case C-400/12. See also Jarusevicius, cited supra note 73, Onuekwere, cited supra note 76 and 
Q4 concerning the impact on this in relation to level two protection.   
113
 FV (Italy), cited supra note 70, decided 14
th
 September 2012.  
114
 Ibid.,at paras 82 and 85.  
115
 Ibid., at paras 81 and 84. In PI, cited supra note 81, there had been two years’ custody 
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116
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117
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of origin.
118
 In numerous cases, national courts have emphasised the need for a 
present threat to a fundamental interest of society and warned against using 
previous convictions or offender assessment reports made at the time of the 
offence to inform a deportation decision.
119
 However, in several cases, previous 
convictions have been combined with evidence of an individual’s continued 
unwillingness to reform or to abide by the criminal law; a willingness to mislead 
judges;
120
 escalating levels of violence;
121
 and even financial circumstances, to 
determine a present threat on the facts.
122
  
 
48. The risk of re-offending is often central to the question of whether the 
appellant poses a present threat and to whether deportation is proportionate. 
Following Tsakouridis, this risk is increasingly assessed by reference to the 
potential impact of deportation on the rehabilitation and social integration of the 
EU citizen/family member concerned. The ‘European dimension’ to this question 
is acknowledged. Thus, the Court of Appeal has stated that ‘common sense would 
suggest a degree of shared interest between the EEA countries in helping progress 
towards a better form of life’.123 This encompasses comparing the prospects for 
rehabilitation in the UK against those in the Member State of origin.
124
 Such 
comparisons necessitate the consideration of the factors contained in Art 28 CRD. 
Accordingly, national courts consistently take into account factors such as the 
applicant’s social, familial, and cultural links in the UK and compare them with, 
for instance, the individual’s knowledge of the language of his/her Member State 
of origin, and the availability (or not) of familial and financial support in that 
State, when deciding whether deportation is permissible.
125
 However, there are 
some examples of a potentially tokenistic consideration of these questions 
resulting from a possible tendency by the national courts to overlook personal 
circumstances or use a one size fits all approach in relation to personal wealth.
126
   
 
 Differentiation: Determining the type of conduct which falls within 
each level 
 
49. UK courts have recognised that, as derogations to the rights of free movement, 
grounds of public policy, public security, and public health must be interpreted 
strictly.
127
 While national courts have seen merit in using administrative guidance 
                                                        
118
 Reg 21(6) EEA Regulations/Art 28(1) CRD. See, for instance, BF (Portugal) v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department [2009] EWCA Civ 923. 
119
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72.  
120
 Jarusevicius, cited supra note 73. 
121
 Batista v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] EWCA Civ 896. 
122
 Flaneur’s, cited supra note 120. 
123
 Ibid. per Carnwath LJ. See also NYK, cited supra note 105.  
124
 Accordingly, a proportionality assessment under the CRD should not be conflated with a 
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narrower than under the CRD. See R. (on the application of Essa) v Upper Tribunal (Immigration 
and Asylum Chamber) [2012] EWCA Civ 1718.  
125
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126
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127
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to categorise the type of conduct that would justify deportation under levels one, 
two and three,
128
 they have explicitly stated that administrative operational 
manuals do not provide formal, legal categories.
129
 They have also openly 
questioned whether administrative guidance adequately distinguishes between 
different levels of protection, especially in light of the case law of the Court of 
Justice. As a result, differentiation based on ‘severity’ of the conduct or custodial 
sentence length alone has been rejected.
130
      
 
50. The courts have held that conduct falling within level one presupposes and 
encompasses the existence of a genuine and sufficiently serious threat to the 
requirements of public policy affecting one of the fundamental interests of 
society.
131
 Examples of crimes justifying deportation at level one include culpable 
homicide,
132
 the use of forged or stolen passports,
133
 and conspiracy to handle 
stolen goods.
134
 Although activity does not have to be criminal, it will rarely be 
permissible to refuse to admit, or deport, an individual in relation to activity that is 
not even unlawful under UK law.
135
 
 
51. Concrete examples of offences that have been held to constitute ‘serious’  
grounds of public policy and public security (level 2 protection) include serious 
domestic burglaries,
136
 conspiracy to handle stolen goods,
137
 and violent crime not 
only against society but also against the person. In the absence of Union-level 
guidance, the Court of Appeal considers that the Member States have a certain 
amount of discretion in deciding what level of violence its law-abiding citizens 
must put up with under level two, with due regard to the seriousness of the 
conduct under domestic law.
138
 In Batista,
139
 a ‘medium risk of serious harm to the 
public’, amongst other things, was sufficient to establish level two grounds.140 
 
52. Administrative guidance provides the following examples of conduct falling 
within ‘imperative grounds’ (level 3 protection): murder, terrorism, drug 
                                                        
128
 LG (Italy), cited supra note 70. The AIT also considered a questionnaire, sent by the Secretary 
of State to other Member States, which asked how ‘imperative grounds’ were defined in those 
states.  
129
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130
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134
 Jarusevicius, cited supra note 73. 
135
 GW (Netherlands) [2009] UKAIT 50, concerning the expression of views that Islam should not 
be tolerated or followed.  
136
 R. v Laurusevicius (Vytautas) [2008] EWCA Crim 3020. 
137
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cited supra note 73. 
138
 B (Netherlands) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] EWCA Civ 806, reasoned 
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Van Duyn v Home Office [1974] ECR 1337; See also Batista, cited supra note 122. 
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 Cited supra note 122.  
140
 The conflated consideration of ‘serious grounds’ and a ‘sufficiently serious threat to a 
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trafficking, serious immigration offences, or serious sexual or violent offences 
carrying a maximum penalty of ten years or more imprisonment.
141
 The national 
courts have generally adopted a restrictive approach to the definition of imperative 
grounds, holding that, even if the threshold includes crimes other than terrorism, 
the threat must be ‘so compelling that it justifies the exceptional course of 
removing someone who…has become “integrated” by “many years residence in 
the host State”’.142 The risk of the future commission of even serious offences will 
not be enough.
143
 Accordingly, the difference between levels two and three cannot 
be merely a matter of degree but must entail a qualitative difference.
144
 The Court 
of Appeal, in FV,
145
 has recently interpreted the Court of Justice’s decisions in 
Tsakouridis and PI as meaning that any deportation decision must consider, inter 
alia, the exceptional seriousness of the threat; the serious negative consequences 
deportation might have on the rehabilitation of genuinely integrated Union citizens 
and therefore whether the measure is strictly necessary or the objective can be met 
through less strict means. ‘Imperative grounds’ presuppose not just a threat to 
public security, but also one of a particular high degree of seriousness to the calm 
and physical security of the population.
146
 Accordingly, the appellant’s conviction 
for manslaughter did not constitute ‘imperative grounds of public security.’ A 
distinction was drawn here between the risk of homicide to the public at random 
and potential for violence towards a specific person.  
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Part 2: EU citizenship beyond Directive 2004/38 EC – 
exploring national application of primary EU law 
 
Question 7 
 
 To what extent has the Court of Justice’s case law grounded directly on the 
TFEU’s citizenship provisions (e.g. Chen, Ruiz Zambrano and subsequent 
decisions) been effectively implemented and applied at the national level? 
Have legislative or specific administrative changes been put in place?  
 
53. The Court of Justice's case law grounded directly on the Treaty provisions on 
Union citizenship has bolstered further the rights of EU citizens, particularly as 
regards the right of residence for their dependent TCN family members. In Chen, 
on reference from the UK, the CJEU established a right of residence for primary 
carers of minor EU citizens resident in a Member State of which they are not a 
national – subject to self-sufficiency and a requirement for medical insurance.147 
In Ruiz Zambrano the Court of Justice developed its case law on Union citizenship 
rights further by concluding that Art 20 TFEU precluded national measures that 
had the effect of depriving Union citizens of the ‘genuine enjoyment’ of the rights 
conferred on them by the Treaty as citizens of the Union. On the facts of that case, 
this conferred a right to reside and work on the TCN parents of dependent minor 
EU citizens, residing in their home Member State, who would have to leave the 
territory of the Union if such rights were not bestowed upon their parents.
148
 
 
54. The UK Government has implemented CJEU’s jurisprudence on primary law 
citizenship rights though a series of statutory amendments. The Immigration 
(EEA) (Amendment) Regulations 2012 amends the EEA Regulations to give 
effect to the Court of Justice's decision in Chen.
149
 That instrument amends Regs 
11 and 15A of the EEA Regulations accordingly by providing rights of entry and 
residence for 'the primary carer of an EEA, who is (a) under the age of 18 and (b) 
residing in the United Kingdom as a self-sufficient person, where the denial of 
such a right would prevent the EEA national child from exercising his or her own 
right of residence'.
150
 A second instrument, the Immigration (EEA) (Amendment) 
(No 2) Regulations 2012 gives effect to the Ruiz Zambrano judgment.
151
 It amends 
the EEA Regulations by conferring rights of entry and residence on the 'primary 
carer of a British citizen who is residing in the United Kingdom and where the 
denial of such a right of residence would prevent the British citizen from being 
able to reside in the United Kingdom or in an EEA State'.
152
 Significantly, where a 
Union citizen minor has two primary carers, the amended EEA Regulations state 
                                                        
147
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that both primary carers must be required to leave the UK before a derivative right 
can be enjoyed by P.
153
 As the wording of the amended EEA Regulations makes 
clear, the UK has opted for a narrow transposition of the Zambrano decision, 
closely orientated around the particular facts at issue in that decision.
154
 Broadly, 
this is in line with the terms of the CJEU’s subsequent clarifications in e.g. 
McCarthy, Dereci and Iida.
155
 
 
55. Significant consequential changes have also been made to UK legislation on 
social security entitlement in light of CJEU’s case law on primary law citizenship 
rights. Perhaps most notably, the UK legal framework has been amended to 
exclude entitlement to a range of UK social assistance benefits for persons resident 
in the UK under the terms of the Ruiz Zambrano ruling.
156
 Additionally, the 
amended EEA Regulations make it clear that individuals residing in the UK on the 
basis of derived residence rights conferred by primary EU law cannot acquire 
permanent residence under Art 16 CRD. This introduces an important additional 
restriction on EU citizenship rights in the UK context. Such individuals can also 
be deported more easily.
157
 
 
 How are these matters being dealt with by the national courts? Does national 
case law distinguish clearly between rights acquired under Directive 2004/38 
and under Articles 20 and/or 21 TFEU when EU citizens are seeking family 
reunification rights from their home State? 
 
56. There is a growing body of case law addressing EU citizenship rights beyond 
the CRD framework. A review of the jurisprudence indicates that, overall, UK 
courts and tribunals are responding appropriately to the evolving case law of the 
Court of Justice in this area. For instance, the reasoning of national courts and 
tribunals indicates that they are capable of distinguishing clearly between the 
rights acquired under the CRD and those under Arts 20 and/or 21 TFEU. UK 
courts have demonstrated that they are able to progress logically through the co-
authored framework of citizenship rights guaranteed in Union law – assessing, in 
sequence, the rights contained with the CRD; the subsequent case law of the ECJ 
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extending the scope of EU legislative provisions;
158
 and the jurisprudence on 
Union citizenship rights under primary EU law.
159
 
 
57. First, with respect to the Chen ruling, UK courts and tribunals were quick to 
recognise that that decision establishes, in primary EU law, a derived right of 
residence for TCN family members in their capacity as primary carers of 
dependent minor EU citizens.
160
 Much of the subsequent UK case law on Chen 
addresses the interpretation of the conditions attached to the existence of the 
derived residence right under primary EU law established in that decision: self-
sufficiency and the requirement for comprehensive medical insurance. On this 
matter, UK courts have upheld the requirement to satisfy both conditions in order 
to establish the derived right of residence under Chen.
161
 Additionally, in W 
(China), the Court also concluded that Art 20 TFEU did not establish a right to 
work in the host Member State for TCN family members; in other words, that 
provision did not enable such persons to create sufficient resources for the family 
unit as required in Chen.
162
 The House of Lords rejected a request for permission 
to appeal this assessment, noting that there was ‘no scope of reasonable doubt’ on 
this issue.
163
 
 
58. In relation to Ruiz Zambrano, it is worth noting in the first instance, that cases 
involving very similar facts have been resolved with no reference to Ruiz 
Zambrano or the genuine enjoyment test. For example, in ZH
164
 Lady Hale found 
that the validity of a decision to deport the TCN parent of a British child, who may 
take that child with him/her, was to be determined by reference to the best interests 
of the child and in accordance with the UK’s obligations under the United 
Nation’s Convention on the rights of the child.  
 
59. Nevertheless, UK courts have engaged with Ruiz Zambrano in several key 
cases.
165
 In summary, national courts have adopted a restrictive approach to that 
judgment, relying frequently on the Court of Justice’s subsequent decision in 
Dereci.
166
 The Ruiz Zambrano ruling is now understood as being ‘exceptional’ in 
character, and is not considered to cover anything short of the situation in which 
an EU citizen is forced to leave the territory of the Union.
167
 Whilst strong 
emotional and psychological ties within the family would be significantly likely to 
rupture in instances of separation, diminishing the enjoyment of life in the UK, 
this would not, on its own, trigger the Ruiz Zambrano principle. Only when quality 
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of life is so diminished that an individual is effectively compelled to leave Union 
territory would Ruiz Zambrano apply. Consequently, the High Court has explicitly 
stated that ‘where a non-EU ascendant relative is compelled to leave EU territory, 
the Art 20 [TFEU] rights of an EU child will not be infringed if there is another 
ascendant relative who has the right of residence in the EU, and who can and will 
in practice care for the child.’168 The courts have, however, taken a fact-sensitive 
approach to the application of this rule, noting, for instance, in MDB that Union 
citizen children could not be cared for by their abusive Italian national father if 
their Argentine mother were deported.
169
  
 
60. New factual constellations that push the boundaries of Ruiz Zambrano have 
chiefly concerned what other rights – aside from the right of residence and the 
right to work – must be respected in order to ensure that a Union citizen is not 
compelled to leave the Union territory. In this connection, the intervention of the 
Home Secretary in Pryce v Southwark LBC
170
 suggests that the question of a Ruiz 
Zambrano-based right to social welfare has arisen frequently at the administrative 
level. In that case, it was held that an individual would have a right to certain 
social benefits once a residence right has been established pursuant to Ruiz 
Zambrano. However, due to a significant concession made by the defendant local 
council in that case, Pryce does not establish whether recourse to and denial of 
social assistance will itself give rise to a Ruiz Zambrano right of residence. The 
Court of Appeal considered this to be fact-sensitive.  
 
61. The argument that denial of social welfare to a TCN parent effectively 
compels Union citizen children to leave the Union territory is currently before the 
national courts in Sanneh.
171
 Now on appeal to the Court of Appeal, the Upper 
Tribunal rejected Sanneh’s case because she had been ‘surviving’ in the UK since 
2006 and was continuing to do so in 2011. As a result, she was not compelled to 
leave the Union territory. Similarly, Sanneh’s application to the High Court for the 
interim payment of social welfare while her substantive case proceeded through 
the court system was rejected on the basis that Sanneh had ‘survived’ in the UK to 
date and that Sanneh herself had accepted that she would never, in practice, leave 
the UK due to economic pressure as she was ‘absolutely determined’ to stay in the 
UK as her case progressed. The High Court in Sanneh rejected the argument that 
paragraph 44 of Ruiz Zambrano
172
 means that it must be assumed, irrebuttably and 
as a matter of law, that a person such as Sanneh must be accorded both the right to 
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residence and to access a particular level of funds by way of earnings or 
benefits.
173
  
 
62. National courts have also been charged with determining whether Ruiz 
Zambrano applies to non-British Union citizens living in the UK. While this is 
clearly not anticipated in the 2012 amendments to the EEA Regulations, the Upper 
Tribunal held in Ahmed that ‘nothing said by the Court of Justice in any of the Art 
20 TFEU cases excludes the potential application of Ruiz Zambrano principles to 
third country national parents if the practical effect of a refusal decision is that the 
children are obligated to leave the territory of the Union as a whole, 
notwithstanding that the children are not, as in Ruiz Zambrano, citizens of the host 
Member State’.174 The application of Ruiz Zambrano to non-British Union citizen 
children arguably undercuts the conditions attached to the derived rights of 
residence for TCN primary carers established in Chen, rendering it unnecessary to 
meet the requirements for sufficient resources and conferring a right to work on 
relevant individuals. However, the emerging UK case law on this potential 
extension to the scope of the Ruiz Zambrano ruling is far from clear. For instance, 
in JYZ, the Court of Session held that Irish citizen children would not be 
compelled to leave the territory of the Union if their TCN parents were not 
afforded the right to work in the UK as the family could move to Ireland where 
Ruiz Zambrano would apply.
175
 
 
 To what extent do national courts and tribunals tend to reject arguments based 
on EU citizenship rights on grounds that the dispute involves a ‘purely internal 
situation’?  
 
63. Decisions of the UK courts and tribunals make occasional reference to the 
existence of a ‘purely internal situation’ or, to the same effect, the absence on the 
facts of a relevant ‘connecting factor’ to EU law.176 UK courts and tribunals apply 
these linguistic markers simply to acknowledge that the legal dispute in issue does 
not fall within the scope of the Court’s existing case law on Union citizenship 
rights beyond the CRD. For example, in Bent, the Court concluded that there was 
‘no EU law connection’ on the basis of the finding that the claimant could not be 
reasonably regarded as the primary carer of a minor EU citizen.
177
 
 
64. There is particularly interesting discussion of the internal rule in Harrison. In 
that decision Elias LJ accepted that free movement can generally be breached by 
activity that impedes, rather than totally deprives an individual of that right. 
However, Elias LJ took the view that a stricter test was necessary in relation to the 
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genuine enjoyment test in Ruiz Zambrano ‘precisely because it does not require 
the exercise of free movement’.178 Thus, whilst the Court of Justice still insists that 
there is an ‘intrinsic connection’ between free movement and the genuine 
enjoyment test,
179
 the UK Court of Appeal, in this case at least, seems to have 
accepted that, in some instances, the purely internal rule, as a synonym for a cross-
border requirement, no longer applies. Indeed, the Court of Appeal considered that 
Ruiz Zambrano had removed the condition of ‘even an exiguous cross-border 
link’, previously required by Chen. 
 
Question 8 
 
 In the context of the judgment in Rottmann, to what extent do rules on the 
acquisition and/or loss of national citizenship reflect the implications of the 
particular requirements of EU citizenship?  
 
65. The British Nationality Act 1981 (as amended) sets out the principal rules on 
the acquisition and loss of British citizenship.
180
 That instrument defines various 
categories of British nationality in an effort to rationalise and narrow entitlement 
to key citizenship rights (chiefly: the right of abode in the UK).
181
 At the same 
time, the 1981 Act also seeks to recognise both the historic and continuing links 
that many overseas nationals have with the United Kingdom. The declaration of 
the UK Government on the definition of ‘nationals,’ annexed to the EU Treaties, 
defines the categories of person considered to be nationals of the United Kingdom 
for the purposes of EU law.
182
 The EUDO Citizenship Observatory provides a 
detailed overview of the rules governing the acquisition and loss of British 
citizenship.
183
  
 
66. The 1981 Act makes no special provision for EEA nationals. It has also not 
been amended in light of Court of Justice’s decision in Rottmann.184 However, the 
UK legal framework on nationality acquisition/loss is arguably relatively open to 
the unique features of Union citizens. First and foremost, UK law does not 
preclude British citizens from holding dual or multiple nationalities – in contrast to 
certain other Member States. EEA nationals who acquire British citizenship are, 
therefore, not, as matter of UK law, required to surrender the nationality of their 
home Member State, as was the case under both German and Austrian law in 
Rottmann. The decision to renounce British citizenship is, from a UK legal 
perspective, entirely at the discretion of the citizen concerned. S.12 of the 1981 
Act provides that a British citizen may renounce their citizenship by declaration on 
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179
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the condition that they will become a citizen of another country within 6 
months.
185
 Further, it is also open to British citizens to reinstate British citizenship 
by registration if that status was renounced in order to acquire the citizenship of 
another (Member) State.
186
 However, resumption under s.13 of the 1981 Act is 
permitted only once.
187
 This limitation might potentially, over the course of a 
lifetime, impact on the migration choices of EU citizens (including British 
citizens) who hold, have held, or wish to acquire British citizenship. 
 
67. Non-British EU citizens over the age of 18 and of full capacity may acquire 
the status of ‘British citizen’ through naturalization.188 The general rules in the 
1981 Act apply: requiring persons to satisfy a minimum residence period of 5 
years (with requirements related to absences etc); to demonstrate good character; 
sufficient knowledge of English, Welsh or Scots Gaelic as well as of life in the 
United Kingdom.
189
 Applicants must also declare an intention to reside in the UK 
as their principal home.  
 
68. S.40 of the British Nationality Act 1981 permits the Secretary of State to 
deprive persons of their status as British citizens. First, the Secretary of State may 
issue an order to this effect where he/she is satisfied that to do so is ‘conducive to 
the public good.’ An order may not be issued in circumstance where the individual 
would be left stateless.
190
 Secondly, s.40(4) of the 1981 Act permits the Secretary 
of State to deprive a person of British citizenship by order where that status was 
acquired – through registration or naturalization – by fraud; false representation; or 
concealment of material facts. In all cases under s.40, the Secretary of State is 
required to give reasons for the deprivation order. The individual concerned is also 
afforded certain rights of appeal. The Rottmann judgment suggests that, subject to 
the demands of the proportionality principle, s.40 of the 1981 Act may be 
compatible with the requirement of EU law. In that decision, the Grand Chamber 
noted expressly that EU law did not, in principle, preclude a Member State from 
depriving its nationals of its citizenship where this had been obtained by fraud or 
deception.
191
 With respect to s. 40(2) – deprivation ‘conducive to the public good’ 
– the UK rules on the loss of citizenship may also be defensible. In Rottmann, the 
CJEU pointed clearly to the possibility of justifying revocation decisions for 
reasons ‘relating to the public interest,’ within which it is arguably possible to 
subsume the substance of s.40(2) of the UK Act.
192
 
 
69. The Rottmann decision remains particularly relevant in the UK context in 
connection with decisions to revoke British citizenship from persons who 
hold/have held the nationality of a non-Member State. In such instances, the 
revocation of British citizenship under the 1981 Act necessarily deprives such 
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individuals of the status of Union citizenship. Thus far, the UK courts appear 
reluctant to engage with Rottmann in that context. In G1 v Secretary of State, the 
appellant had argued that, following Rottmann, the decision to revoke his British 
citizenship under s.40(2) of the 1981 Act triggered the application of EU law.
193
 
Interpreting the Grand Chamber’s decision in Rottmann, it was argued that loss of 
British citizenship necessarily entailed the loss of the appellant’s status as a Union 
citizen.
194
 For that reason, the decision to deprive him of his British citizenship fell 
within the scope of EU law, meaning that national law must ‘have due regard to 
EU law.’ The Court of Appeal rejected this argument outright. It took the view 
that there was ‘no cross-border element whatsoever’ to the case.195 On the facts, 
the appellant was a British citizen who had not exercised his Treaty free 
movement rights. On one view, this was a key distinction with Rottmann. 
However, by adopting this position, the Court arguably failed to engage with 
another, broader reading of that decision; namely, that Member State authorities 
are obliged post-Rottmann to have regard to EU law in connection with the 
deprivation of national citizenship per se because this would also lead to the loss 
of Union citizenship. On that possible interpretation, the Court of Appeal was 
clear. If the CJEU had intended in Rottmann to establish such an approach, then 
this raised serious concerns about the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice in the 
area of Member State nationality law.
196
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Part 3: Political Rights of EU Citizens 
 
Question 9 
 
 Since when has Directive 93/109/EC on European Parliament elections been 
fully implemented? Have there been any derogations? Are there any additional 
conditions imposed on EU citizens compared to national citizens (special 
registration or residence requirements)?  
 
70. Directive 93/109 EC grants Union citizens the right to vote and stand as a 
candidate in elections to the European Parliament as residents of a Member State 
of which they are not nationals. The UK implemented that instrument in 1994 
within 15 days of the transposition deadline through the European Parliamentary 
Elections (Changes to the Franchise and Qualification of Representatives) 
Regulations.
197
 The 1994 Regulations amended para.5 of Schedule 1 of the 
European Parliament Elections Act 1978 to provide Union citizens who are not 
British citizens but resident in the UK with the right to stand as a candidate in 
elections to the European Parliament.
198
 Reg 7 of the 1994 Regulations extended 
the franchise to vote in European Parliamentary elections to the same category of 
persons. The Commission’s 1998 Report on the application of Directive 93/109 
EC identified no specific concerns with the UK’s implementation of that 
instrument.
199
 
 
71. The legal framework governing EU citizens’ right to vote and stand for 
election in European Parliamentary elections has been subject to several 
amendments. The 1978 Act has been replaced by the European Parliamentary 
Elections Act 2002 (hereinafter: the 2002 Act). Section 8(5) of the 2002 Act 
currently regulates the electoral franchise. The relevant rules to which that section 
refers are set out in revised Regulations.
200
 The 2002 Act also repealed the 
provisions of the 1994 Regulations governing the right of resident non-national 
EU citizens to stand as candidates in European Parliamentary elections. The 
current rules are set out in the European Parliamentary Regulations 2004.
201
 The 
UK legislative provisions fully implement Directive 93/109 EC.    
 
72. With respect to the right to vote, the UK has not opted to implement Art 
9(3)(a)-(c) of Directive 93/109 EC. Under that provision Member States may 
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require EU citizens to declare that they have not been deprived of the right to vote 
in their home Member State; to produce a valid ID document; and/or to indicate 
the date from which they have been resident in the host Member State. However, 
the UK has invoked the derogation in Art 14(2) of Directive 93/109 EC to exempt 
Irish nationals from the registration regime established in that instrument. Under 
Reg. 1(2) of the 2011 Regulations, Irish nationals, as well as Commonwealth 
citizens (here: citizens of the UK, Malta or Cyprus) are excluded from the 
definition of ‘relevant citizen of the Union’ to which the Regulations apply. This 
special provision for Irish and certain Commonwealth citizens reflects the 
particular constitutional relationship between the UK and citizens of these 
Member States.
202
 Finally, as for voter registration, the UK has not opted to 
require Union citizens to provide a valid ID document to support their application 
to stand as candidates in elections to the European Parliament. Art 10(3) of the 
Directive permits this restriction.  
 
 What additional changes will be required by the December 2012 amendments 
to Directive 93/109/EC?  
 
73. The UK Government has already prepared a draft statutory instrument to 
implement the changes required by Directive 2013/1 EU.
203
 The draft European 
Parliamentary Elections (Amendment) Regulations 2013 abolishes the requirement 
for Union citizens wishing to stand as election candidate to obtain an attestation 
from their home Member State certifying that they have not been deprived of their 
right to stand as a candidate in that Member State or that no disqualification is 
known to them. The 2013 draft Regulations replaces the attestation requirement, 
which was identified as a barrier to the exercise of Union citizens’ rights,204 with 
an obligation on candidates to declare that they have not been deprived of their 
right to stand in their home Member State. The host Member State is then required 
to check the validity of this declaration in cooperation with the designated 
authority in candidate’s home Member State. 
 
 Has there been relevant case law in domestic courts? 
 
74. The issue of prisoners’ voting rights takes centre stage in the UK case law on 
European Parliamentary elections.
205
 This important line of case law is considered 
in Q12 below. Aside from the issue of prisoners’ voting rights, there is relatively 
little judicial activity on the topic of EU citizens’ right of participation in elections 
to the European Parliament. The case law on European Parliamentary elections in 
the national context has focussed on extensions to the franchise. In Matthews, the 
European Court of Human Rights held that the UK had violated Article 3 of the 
Protocol 1 of the ECHR by excluding Gibraltarians from voting in European 
Parliamentary elections.
206
 The UK Government amended its election rules to give 
effect to the Court’s judgment. The European Court of Justice subsequently 
confirmed the validity under EU law of the amended UK provisions in the context 
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of an Art 258 TFEU infringement procedure initiated by the Spanish 
Government.
207
 
 
Question 10 
 
 Since when has Directive 94/80/EC on local elections been fully implemented?  
 
75. The UK was one of the first four Member States to transpose fully Directive 
94/80 EC, which lays down arrangements for the exercise of the right to vote and 
stand as a candidate in municipal elections for citizens of the Union residing in a 
Member State of which they are not a national. Transposition was in the form of a 
statutory instrument, namely the Local Government Elections (Changes to the 
Franchise and Qualification of Members) Regulations 1995.
208
 This amended, 
inter alia, the Representation of the People Act 1983, allowing a person to vote at 
local government elections if he is, on the day of the poll, a relevant citizen of the 
Union. S.1(c) of the Elected Authorities (Northern Ireland) Act 1989 introduces 
the changes for local elections in Northern Ireland. ‘Citizen of the Union’ is 
defined by reference to Art 20 TFEU, whilst ‘relevant Union citizen’ refers to 
Union citizens who are not citizens of the Commonwealth or the Republic of 
Ireland.
209
  Various pieces of primary legislation divided according to region allow 
‘relevant Union citizens’ to stand as candidates in local government elections: the 
Local Government Act 1972, s.79; The Local Government (Scotland) Act 1973 
s.29; The Local Government Act (Northern Ireland) 1972 s.3; and the Greater 
London Authority Act 1999 s.20. The terms ‘citizen of the Union’ and ‘relevant 
Union citizen’ are defined as they are above.210 
 
 Have there been any derogations?  
 
76. Directive 94/80 EC permits derogations from the general rule that Union 
citizens should be able to vote in local elections in the host Member State where 
the proportion of non-national Union citizens of voting age in that Member State 
exceeds 20% of the total number of Union citizens residing there.
211
 This does not 
apply to the UK and has not been used by the UK.
212
 Under Art 12(3), a Member 
State may also derogate from Arts 6-11 of the Directive, which relate to the 
exercise of the right to vote and stand as a candidate in municipal elections, in 
respect of non-national Union citizens who have a right to vote in national 
parliamentary elections and are thus entered on the national roll under exactly the 
same conditions as national voters. Although Irish, Maltese and Cypriot citizens 
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can vote in UK parliamentary elections, the UK has not availed itself of this 
derogation. The UK has a separate register of ‘local government electors’.    
 
 Are there any additional conditions imposed on EU citizens compared to 
national citizens (special registration or residence requirements)? 
 
77. In order to be able to vote in elections in the UK, individuals must register to 
vote, whether they are British nationals or not. There are number of conditions for 
eligibility that apply equally to British citizens and eligible voters of other 
nationalities. Similarly, the UK imposes no additional requirements on EU citizens 
when compared with UK nationals in relation to standing as a candidate in local 
government elections. The Directive permits Member States to restrict some posts 
related to the executive of local government to its own nationals. However, the UK 
has not opted to impose any such restrictions. Accordingly, in the UK, a non-
national EU citizen can be the head, deputy or member of the executive of basic 
government units.
213
  
 
 Has there been relevant case law in domestic courts? 
78. The only UK case law relevant to the discussion of the voting rights under 
Directive 94/80 EC is discussed in Q12 below. This concerns attempts to invoke 
EU law in order to contest the UK’s prohibition on prisoner voting. 
 Other issues relating to the voting rights of Union citizens 
 
79. According to the European Commission’s 2012 report on the application of 
Directive 94/80/EC, awareness of the right to vote for EU citizens living in the UK 
had risen from 32% in November 2007 to 72% in March 2010. Further, the UK 
has adopted target measures to inform EU citizens of their electoral rights in 
municipal elections by activating a dedicated helpline. Overall turnout in local 
elections is nevertheless low. In London’s most recent municipal elections, at the 
time of the report, turnout was just 45.30% while in Salford, it was 29.35%.
214
 
Turnout, nationally, in the May 2013 local elections was 31%. National research 
has found that registration rates are lower amongst eligible non-UK nationals: 
while 84% of UK nationals are registered to vote, only 56% of Union citizens 
resident in the UK have registered.
215
 For the May 2013 elections, the Electoral 
Commission developed new media advertisements using the online platform 
www.itsyourvote.org to encourage interaction and as an opportunity to target 
under-registered groups.
216
 Used as a ‘test run’, the Electoral Commission is 
looking to use this campaign in relation to the European Parliamentary elections in 
2014.  
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Question 11 
 
 Briefly report on regional and other elections in which EU citizens residing in 
the country are granted electoral rights under national law. Is there a 
franchise for EU citizens that goes beyond the local and EP electoral rights 
required under EU law? What have been the reasons for extending such rights 
specifically to EU citizens? 
 
80. The right to vote has been extended to (certain) Union citizens beyond the 
franchise for Union citizens in local and European Parliament elections required 
by Directives 94/109 EC and 94/80 EC in the following areas: 
 
- National parliamentary elections 
- Elections in relation to devolved bodies 
- Police commissioner elections  
 
 National parliamentary elections   
 
81. Under S.1 of the Representation of the People Act 1983, citizens of the 
Commonwealth and of the Republic of Ireland can vote in national parliamentary 
elections. As a result citizens of Cyprus, Malta, and the Republic of Ireland are 
eligible to vote in all elections within the UK. This is because Commonwealth 
citizens and citizens of Ireland are not viewed as ‘foreign’ in UK law.217  
 
 Elections to devolved administrations  
 
82. Under s.11(1)(b) of the Scotland Act 1998, those who are registered to vote in 
the register of local government electors are entitled to vote in Scottish 
Parliamentary elections. As Union citizens are permitted to vote in local 
government elections, they appear on this register. Union citizens are therefore 
also able to vote in Scottish parliamentary elections. Under Article 16(2) of the 
same Act, a citizen of the European Union resident in the United Kingdom, is not 
disqualified from being a member of the Scottish Parliament because he was born 
outside the United Kingdom.
218
 The same rules apply in relation to The Welsh 
Assembly, by virtue of s.12(1)(b) and 17(2) of the Government of Wales Act 
2006.  
 
83. The right of Union citizens to vote in elections to the Scottish and Welsh 
administrations is, therefore, based on their inclusion on local government 
registers, rather than as a result of an explicit provision that makes specific 
reference to a right of the European citizen to vote in elections to devolved bodies. 
Nevertheless, this ‘loophole’ is openly acknowledged. The general information 
website for voting in the UK ‘www.aboutmyvote.co.uk’ states that Union citizens 
can vote in such elections.
219
 Furthermore, Union citizens were able to vote in the 
referendums concerning the establishment of the Scottish Parliament and Welsh 
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Assembly in the first place. In relation to the forthcoming referendum on Scottish 
Independence, s.2 of the Scottish Independence Referendum (Franchise) Act 2013 
states that, ‘a person is entitled to vote in an independence referendum if, on the 
date on which the poll at the referendum is held, the person is… a relevant citizen 
of the European Union.’   
 
84. Union citizens in Northern Ireland were permitted to vote in the last election to 
the Northern Irish Assembly but were not permitted to vote in the referendum on 
the voting system.
220
 S.36(7) of the Northern Ireland Act 1998 clearly states that: 
A person is not disqualified for membership of the Assembly…by reason 
only…that he is born out[side] of the Kingdom if he is a citizen of the European 
Union.  
 
85. Although electors for elections for devolved bodies are drawn from local 
government elections, national courts do not appear to consider the devolved 
administrations in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland as ‘basic local 
government units’ under Directive 94/80 EC. As a result, the right to vote in such 
elections is interpreted as extending the franchise for Union citizens beyond the 
requirements of the Directive rather than as implementing it. This is clear from the 
approach of the Supreme Court in McGeoch.
221
 In that case, the Court noted 
expressly that elections to the Scottish Parliament did not constitute ‘municipal 
elections’ within the meaning of Directive 94/80 EC. In its view, municipal 
elections referred specifically to ‘local government elections at a lower level of 
government, closer to people and with a more direct responsibility for service 
delivery’.222 
 
86. In relation to the London Assembly, s.17 of the Greater London Authority Act 
1999 makes reference to Schedule 3 of the same Act which amends the 
Representation of the People Act 1983, treating elections to the London Assembly 
as local government elections. Under s.20 of the 1999 Act, in order to be Mayor or 
a member of the London Assembly, one must be, inter alia, a ‘relevant citizen of 
the Union’.  
 
 Police commissioners 
 
87. In November 2012, local police authorities were replaced with democratically 
elected ‘Police and Crime Commissioners’ in an attempt to make the police more 
accountable. It is unclear whether this role falls under the description of a ‘basic 
local government unit’ defined in Art 2 of Directive/94/80 EC.223 If it did, a Police 
and Crime Commissioner could reasonably be interpreted as the elected head of 
the basic local government unit. Member States are permitted to restrict such posts 
to their own nationals. Nevertheless, under s.52(1)(a) of the Police Reform and 
Social Responsibility Act 2011, a person is entitled to vote in the elections for the 
Police and Crime Commissioner for their area if they are registered to vote as an 
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elector at a local or government election. Accordingly, this includes Union 
citizens. The right of Union citizens to stand for election results from a combined 
reading of s.66(1) and s.68 of the 2011 Act. 
 
Question 12 
 Are there any specific areas where tensions exist between EU law and national 
provisions limiting the scope of the franchise (e.g. in relation to the voting 
rights of persons convicted of criminal offences or persons with mental 
impairments)?  
88. Two specific areas of tension have recently come to light in the UK case law 
concerning the relationship between EU law and national provisions limiting the 
scope of the franchise. First, the Court of Appeal was requested to rule on whether 
the UK provision on ‘overseas electors’ constitutes an obstacle to intra-EU 
movement. Secondly, as referenced in Q9 and Q10, there is a recent line of 
national case law considering the compatibility with EU law of the current UK 
prohibition on prisoners’ voting.  
 The UK’s ’15-year rule’ on overseas voting as an obstacle to intra-EU 
movement 
 
89. The validity of the UK rules on overseas voting arose in Preston.
224
 In that 
case the applicant, a British citizen resident and engaged in economic activity in 
Spain since 1992, sought judicial review of the UK’s so-called ‘15-year rule’ on 
overseas voting. Under s.1 of the Representation of the People Act 1983, non-
resident British citizens retain the right to vote in national elections as overseas 
electors for a period of 15 years.
225
 The applicant maintained that this limitation 
constituted an obstacle to intra-EU movement in that it was liable to deter 
economic actors and EU citizens from exercising their free movement rights 
guaranteed in Union law.  
 
90. The Court of Appeal accepted that, in principle, the loss of the right to vote 
under the 15-year rule could be qualified as a ‘disadvantage.’226 However, it held 
that not every disadvantage constitutes an obstacle to the exercise of the rights of 
intra-EU movement.
227
 On its view, it was necessary to adopt a ‘long term view’ 
when determining the potential deterrent effect of national measures on EU free 
movement rights.
228
 Further, the Court asserted that electoral rights were 
‘qualitatively and quantitatively different’ from social benefits. 229  National 
measures limiting the latter category of entitlements were considered capable of 
constituting direct and immediate barriers to the exercise of free movement rights. 
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By contrast, and with respect to the relationship between the 15-year rule and the 
exercise of the Treaty free movement rights, the Court concluded that: 
 
‘No legal test, whether formulated in terms of “probability”, or 
“likelihood”, or “capability”, or “liability”, or “real possibility”, 
addresses the basic difficulty that what is asserted in the claimant’s 
case is too speculative, remote and indefinite to establish a case’.230    
 
91. The Court of Appeal also held that, even if evidence could be adduced to 
indicate a deterrent effect, the 15-year rule could be justified in EU law. According 
to the Court, that rule served a legitimate and proportionate objective of testing the 
strength of British citizens’ link with the United Kingdom to ensure that only those 
maintaining close links remain eligible to vote.
231
 In the Court of Appeal’s view, 
the justification ground alone was sufficient to reject the appellant’s request for a 
preliminary reference to the Court of Justice.  
 
 Prisoners’ voting rights and EU law 
 
92. EU law has been recently invoked to challenge the legality of the UK’s blanket 
ban on prisoners’ voting rights.232 Successful attempts have already been made to 
challenge the legality of that prohibition under Art 3 of the 1
st
 Protocol of the 
ECHR.
233
 The UK Government is yet to implement the Strasbourg jurisprudence 
on prisoners’ voting rights.234  
 
93. With respect to Union law, the Supreme Court ruled in October 2013 in 
McGeoch that British citizens detained in custody in the United Kingdom do not 
enjoy the right to vote in municipal elections as a consequence of their status as 
Union citizens.
235
 The argument advanced in support of extending the franchise 
relied principally on the specific wording of Art 20(2)(b) TFEU. That provision, 
inserted by the Treaty of Lisbon, grants Union citizens ‘the right to vote and stand 
as candidates in elections to the European Parliament and in municipal elections in 
their Member State of residence, under the same conditions as nationals of that 
State.’ In McGeoch, it was argued that the omission of the phrase ‘in a Member 
State of which he is not a national’ as a qualifier in Art 20(2)(b) TFEU was 
decisive.
236
 The absence in that provision of any reference to the right to vote in 
host Member States, it was submitted, granted Union citizens electoral rights in 
the Member State of which they are nationals under the terms required by EU law. 
That core argument was bolstered further with reference to the Court of Justice’s 
evolving case law on the rights of static Union citizens – both in terms of political 
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and non-political rights
237
 – as well as to Arts 39 and 40 of the Charter on 
Fundamental Rights. 
 
94. The UK Supreme Court unanimously rejected the argument advanced for the 
appellant to the effect that the insertion of Art 20(2)(b) TFEU had established a 
self-standing right for EU citizens to vote in municipal elections in the Member 
State of which they are nationals. The Supreme Court concluded that it would be 
‘positively misleading’ to adopt such an interpretation of that provision in light of 
the Treaty’s structure.238 The right to vote in municipal elections under EU law 
was considered limited implicitly to resident EU citizens who are not nationals of 
the host Member State.
239
 Lord Mance noted further, that this interpretation of the 
franchise under EU law was also supported by the wording of Arts 39 and 40 of 
the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights.
240
 The Supreme Court also rejected the 
appellant’s request for a preliminary reference to the Court of Justice.241 
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Part 4: Culture(s) of citizenship 
 
Question 13 
 
 On the basis of your findings from the above questions, do you consider that 
the implementation of EU citizenship in your Member State is understood at 
the national level as part of a rights-based EU ‘free movement’ and 
‘constitutional’ culture, or as an adjunct to national immigration systems 
based on ‘permissions’ to non-nationals to be present in the territory? 
 
95. Our findings lead us to conclude that, for the most part, Union citizenship is 
generally still understood in the UK context as an adjunct to national immigration 
law.
242
 With respect to the legislative transposition, administrative application and 
judicial interpretation of the rights of EU citizenship, there is – to differing degrees 
– evidence of a permissions-based approach to the implementation of the rights 
conferred by EU law.
243
 In certain instances, this permissions-based approach is 
inherent in the implementation process itself, e.g. through the transposition of EU 
Directives. In other instances, it follows as a result of administrative and judicial 
‘seepage’ – a phenomenon whereby the approach of the UKBA and national 
courts and tribunals to EU citizenship rights is shaped by the administrative and 
legal framework governing non-EU immigration.
244
 The impact of seepage on the 
culture of EU citizenship within the UK is particularly significant in light of the 
UK’s strong permissions-based system governing non-EU migration.245  
 
96. The transposition of the CRD through the EEA Regulations provides the 
clearest example of the predominantly permissions-based approach to EU 
citizenship rights within the UK. In line with its full title, that instrument 
effectively casts the free movement rights of EU citizens as an adjunct to UK 
immigration law.
246
 That instrument integrates (many of) the rights contained 
within the CRD into a national immigration system that is based squarely on 
frontier controls and residence rights that are directly linked to a non-national’s 
‘leave to enter’ the United Kingdom. 247  Specific provisions of the EEA 
Regulations also permit the immigration detention of EU citizens even prior to the 
adoption of a decision by the Secretary of State to remove that person on grounds 
of public policy, public security and public health grounds.
248
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97. Structured as an adjunct to UK immigration law, the EEA Regulations deal 
only with the CRD rights of entry, residence and expulsion for EU citizens and 
their family members. Other core rights of EU citizenship contained within the 
CRD are not transposed. Most notably, the EEA Regulations do not transpose Art 
24(1) of the CRD – the right to equal treatment.249 That provision is not directly 
transposed in UK law. The UK Government has again taken a permission-based 
approach to the transposition of the rights of equal treatment in Art 21 CRD. As 
discussed in Q5, EU citizens must establish a ‘right to reside’ in the UK under the 
CRD in order to secure access to a range of social assistance benefits. That test 
applies only to non-British citizens. Moreover, it positions EU citizens and their 
family members directly alongside non-EU migrants, who are also required to 
establish a right to reside to secure entitlement to the principal UK social 
assistance benefits. As such, its application further embeds the rights of EU 
citizenship within the general framework of UK immigration law.  
 
98. Our review of the administrative practices of the UKBA provides additional 
evidence to support the view that EU citizenship rights within the UK are 
predominantly construed as permission- rather than rights-based. We have 
identified numerous instances of ‘seepage’ in the approach of UKBA officials 
towards EU nationals and their family members – exposed through litigation. The 
decision of the Court of Appeal in Bassey provides a particularly striking instance 
of seepage in the administrative context.
250
 In that case, UKBA officials failed 
outright to identify and uphold the appellant’s derived rights of entry and 
residence under EU law. UKBA officials simply applied ordinary UK immigration 
rules and, ultimately, detained the appellant pending deportation. Whilst accepting 
that the appellant had falsely declared his intentions, the Court of Appeal strongly 
criticised the approach of the UKBA. In its view, the UKBA had wrongly treated 
the appellant’s situation as a ‘straightforward case of illegal entry by deception by 
an individual with no arguable right to the in the country’.251 The case law on 
‘sham marriages’ exposes further examples of seepage in the administrative 
practices of the UKBA. In several cases, the UKBA has been criticised by the UK 
courts for failing to recognise that the TCN spouse of a EU citizen enjoyed an 
automatic derived right to enter and reside in the United Kingdom under EU 
law.
252
  
 
99. National courts also fall victim to the phenomenon of seepage. By way of 
illustration, we detected some discussion of the ‘credibility’ of individual litigants 
– a benchmark of UK immigration law – in individual EU citizenship cases.253 
This is clearly at odds with the approach to citizenship rights and their abuse in EU 
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law. Additionally, our findings also identified isolated problems with judicial 
implementation of EU citizenship rights. In McCarthy (Q5), for example, the High 
Court upheld the validity of the UK’s refusal to recognise, pursuant to Art 5(2) 
CRD, residence cards issued to TCN nationals by other Member States in 
accordance with the CRD.
254
 In B v Home Office (Q1) that same court adopted a 
particularly restrictive reading of the doctrine of State liability under EU law, in 
respect of a serious administrative delay in issuing a residence permit to an 
extended family member of a Union citizen.
255
 In places, we also detected some 
resistance on the part of national courts to engage fully with particular landmark 
rulings of the CJEU on EU citizenship rights. The Court of Appeal decision in G1 
v Secretary of State (Q8) on the scope of application of the Rottmann judgment 
illustrates this point most forcefully.
256
  
 
100. On the other hand, our review of the UK legal framework also revealed a 
degree of understanding of EU citizenship as a more vibrant, rights-centered legal 
status, distinct from ordinary UK immigration law. National courts and tribunals 
drive this more positive vision of EU citizenship – subject to the preceding 
remarks. Additionally, there is also evidence of a stronger constitutional culture in 
connection with the transposition of the political rights of EU citizenship. In this 
area, EU citizens are closely assimilated with British nationals as rights holders – 
at least insofar as the former enjoy limited electoral participation rights under 
Union law. The political rights of EU citizens have also been extended beyond the 
requirements of Union law. 
 
101. UK courts and tribunals play an absolutely critical role in entrenching the 
constitutional rights-orientated character of EU citizenship within the UK legal 
order. This is clear already from the preceding decisions scrutinising UKBA 
practices (e.g. Bassey). National courts also have corrected errors in the UK 
Government’s transposition of the CRD. As discussed in Q1, the Court of Appeal 
struck down as ‘flagrantly unlawful’ Reg 12(1)(b) of the 2006 Regulations – 
introducing an additional requirement of prior lawful residence within the EEA for 
TCN family members of EU citizens.
257
 However, it is through their approach to 
judicial interpretation that UK courts and tribunals have arguably impacted most 
significantly on the culture of EU citizenship within the UK. Our review of the 
case law demonstrates, to a greater extent, that national courts and tribunals 
broadly understand and, further, are able properly to apply the rights of EU 
citizenship within the national judicial context. This is apparent, in particular, from 
the consistent application of the CRD hierarchy of protection from deportation on 
public policy, public security and public health afforded to Union citizens and 
their family members.
258
Moreover, in numerous cases, UK courts have 
demonstrated their ability to step outside of the UK legal framework and resolve 
EU citizenship cases in accordance with interpretative principles developed and 
                                                        
254
 McCarthy, cited supra note 30. 
255
 B v Home Office, cited supra note 8. 
256
 G1 v Secretary of State, cited supra note 182. 
257
 R.(on the application of Owusu) v Secretary of State, cited supra at note 15.  
258
 See here e.g. BF (Portugal) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] EWCA Civ 
923, LG, CC v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] UKAIT 00024 and B 
(Netherlands) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] EWCA Civ 806. 
T. Horsley and S. Reynolds, Union Citizenship: National Report on the UK 
FIDE XXVI Congress, Copenhagen 2014 
43 
 
applied by the Court of Justice.
259
 Finally, there has been express judicial 
recognition of the ‘fundamental’ character of EU citizens’ rights of movement and 
residence.
260
 
 
102. To a greater extent, UK courts have also responded well to the challenges 
presented by the evolutionary nature of EU citizenship. As demonstrated in Q7 
above, national courts have managed to implement specific CJEU decisions 
enhancing the rights of EU citizens and their family members beyond the terms of 
the CRD – ahead of the legislative transposition of these judgments.261 We also 
identified evidence of the ability of UK courts to transpose the substance of 
particular CJEU decisions to parallel factual constellations. The Court of Appeal’s 
decision in Adaleslu (Q1), in which that Court applied Metock by extension to the 
situation of extended family members, offers a clear illustration of this openness to 
crosspollination.
262
 Equally, when faced with specific questions of interpretation, 
the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court have made appropriate preliminary 
references to the Court of Justice.
263
 Moreover, we would highlight that UK courts 
have also made references to the CJEU in instances where the scope of EU 
citizenship rights was arguably rather clear, but where there was a sense, on the 
part of the referring national court, that greater rights protection is desirable. For 
example, in Jessy ST Prix the Supreme Court requested the CJEU to determine 
whether ‘retained worker’ status in Art 7(3) CRD extends to cover the situation of 
an EU citizen who gives up work, or seeking work, because of the physical 
constraints of the late stages of pregnancy/child birth.
264
 As the Supreme Court 
noted, the CRD is actually rather clear on this point: it does not.
265
 The Supreme 
Court is inviting the Court of Justice to develop further the rights of EU citizens 
beyond the terms of the CRD on fundamental rights grounds.
266
 
 
103. Finally, there is also a somewhat stronger constitutional character to the 
political rights of EU citizenship in the UK. Overall, our findings indicate that EU 
citizens are more closely integrated with British citizens as rights holders in the 
political context. The legislative framework governing the electoral rights of EU 
citizens does not employ the permission-based entitlement tests such as the right to 
reside introduced to govern the exercise of the substantive rights of intra-EU 
movement. Equally, as discussed in Qs 9, 10 and 11 above, the UK Government 
has not opted to introduce special restrictions on the voting rights of EU citizens, 
even where permitted under EU law – contrary to the position of certain other 
Member States. It has also already drafted legislation to implement the changes 
required by Directive 2013/1 EU. The more favorable treatment of EU citizens as 
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compared with the position on entry, residence, and entitlement to social 
advantages may simply be linked to the low cost implications associated with the 
right to vote in municipal and European Parliamentary elections. In any case, the 
strength of rights in this context is an important component of the qualified 
constitutional character of EU citizenship within the UK legal order. A review of 
the legislative framework on municipal elections (Q11), also demonstrates that the 
electoral rights of EU citizens has been extended beyond the terms of Directives 
94/109 EC and 94/80 EC.  
 
Question 14 
 
 Has the binding effect of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union, following entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, played any role 
in how the rights of EU citizens are being interpreted by the national courts? 
 
104. Legal practitioners increasingly make reference to the Charter to support 
arguments concerning the interpretation of the rights of Union citizens before 
national courts. In ZZ, Maurice Kay LJ neatly summarised the impact of the 
Charter in its national context:      
 
‘...the Charter is not a free-standing rights-creating legislative 
instrument. It is akin to a restatement of rights, freedoms and 
principles already established in law as a result of, inter alia, the 
judgments of the Luxembourg Court...what the Charter does not and 
cannot do is to give birth to rights, freedoms and principles in areas 
in which the Treaties claim no rule-making competence but 
acknowledge the exclusive competence of Member States. This is 
spelt out by Article 51.2 of the Charter.’267      
 
105. Based on our findings in this report, we highlight three specific examples of 
the Charter’s emerging impact on the interpretation of the rights of EU citizens 
within the UK: 
 
1) The application of the UK’s contested ‘right to reside’ test 
2) The application of the ‘genuine enjoyment test’ following Ruiz Zambrano  
3) The use of the Charter to create new substantive rights for Union citizens  
 
 The application of the UK’s contested ‘right to reside’ test 
 
106. Attempts have been made in some cases to address the perceived harshness of 
the UK’s current ‘right to reside’ test by using rights that EU citizens derive from 
the Charter. In Mirga,
268
 a Polish national was found not have satisfied the ‘right 
to reside’ test, as she was not a ‘qualified person’, i.e. working, self-employed, or 
self-sufficient, and so did not qualify for income support. M argued that denial of a 
right to reside would violate her right to family life under Article 7 of the Charter, 
as she had given birth to a child in the UK. In considering this argument, the Court 
of Appeal acknowledged, first, that while legal effect was only given to the 
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Charter by the Lisbon Treaty, which post-dated the appellant’s application, the 
fundamental right to family life was a fundamental principle of Union law.
269
 
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal held that ‘the protection of her fundamental 
rights did not require that she be accorded such a “right of residence”.’270 The 
Court of Appeal cited a previous judgment in which it was stated that to allow a 
right of residence where a category of person had clearly been excluded from 
Directive 2004/38 would be an attack on the Directive itself and in which the 
Court did not accept fundamental rights arguments.
271
  
 
 The application of the ‘genuine enjoyment test’ following Ruiz 
Zambrano  
 
107. The Charter of Fundamental Rights has been raised in the arguments of 
appellants in a number of cases relating to whether or not an individual has been 
deprived of the genuine enjoyment of the rights arising from their Union 
citizenship. Applying Dereci, the national courts have repeatedly stated that the 
Charter only applies if the ‘genuine enjoyment’ test is satisfied; in other words, 
that the Charter only applies if the matter falls within the scope of EU law.
272
 
Moreover, relevant national case law consistently features the statement in Dereci 
that a desire to keep one’s family together will not be sufficient, alone, to trigger 
protection under the genuine enjoyment test.
273
 However, the national courts have 
also remarked that Dereci is not entirely clear on whether the separation family 
members can ever trigger the test. In Harrison, Elias LJ suggested that the Court 
of Justice ‘might have been envisaging that Article 7 [EU Charter] could be 
relevant to the question whether the EU citizen was in fact compelled to follow the 
non-EU citizen out of the territory of the EU’ but that the case law had not 
developed to that stage yet. 274 Indeed, in Harrison itself, the Court of Appeal 
focussed on the factual possibility for the British citizen children concerned to 
remain in the Union despite the deportation of their fathers in order to hold that the 
genuine enjoyment test had not been triggered.
275
  
 
 The use of the Charter to create new substantive rights for Union 
citizens  
 
108.  Finally, we highlight that the entry into force of the Charter is also opening 
up new lines of argument for litigants. The example of prisoners’ voting rights was 
discussed above in Q12. Here EU law – and the Charter – is being invoked in 
order to inject a new supranational EU dimension into existing domestic legal 
challenges. In other instances, the Charter is invoked to establish rights in new 
legal contexts. For example, in Sandiford the Charter was invoked unsuccessfully 
in an effort to establish an obligation on the United Kingdom Government to 
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provide legal aid to one of its own nationals who had been convicted and 
sentenced to death in a Third Country for drug trafficking offences.
276
  
 
Question 15 
 
 Please describe the extent to which issues connected to EU citizenship have 
been a salient issue in the national media and how this issue has been dealt 
with in the national media.  
 
109. EU citizenship and related issues feature frequently in the mainstream UK 
media. National media coverage is often rather negative in character, reflecting 
perhaps the influence of a powerful centre-right British press. In the first instance, 
we identified only very infrequent discussion of substantive citizenship ‘rights’ – 
even in strands of the media that are not openly critical of the UK’s continued 
membership of the EU (e.g. BBC; Guardian; Independent). Mirroring the 
legislative framework implementing EU citizenship rights (Q13 above), the UK 
media tends to identify EU nationals as ‘migrants’ or ‘foreign nationals’ rather 
than EU citizens. Notably, there is also only infrequent reporting on the rights 
enjoyed by British nationals as EU citizens in host Member States. The focus is 
squarely centered on incoming ‘migrants,’ which again reinforces the view that 
EU citizenship is simply an adjunct to UK immigration law and not part of a 
framework of reciprocal rights. We would also observe that, where they exist, 
reports on the exercise of Treaty rights by British nationals are often framed 
negatively. This includes, for example, emphasizing the costs to the UK taxpayer 
of the exercise of their rights of intra-EU movement as EU citizens (e.g. ‘European 
Court Ruling will increase the number of Brits abroad who can claim winter fuel 
allowance,’ Daily Mail Jan 2013).277  
 
 Are there any particularly dominant themes within media reporting (e.g. 
expulsion; access to state benefits; derived rights for third country nationals)? 
 
110. The dominant and recurring themes in the UK media related to EU 
citizenship include entitlement to social welfare benefits; access to public services 
(particularly the NHS and State education sector); the rights of entry and residence 
enjoyed by EU citizens and their family members (particularly TCN family 
members); and the EU rules governing the expulsion of Union citizens. These key 
themes feature particularly predominantly in the centre-right UK press (chiefly: 
Telegraph; Daily Mail; Daily Express). Reporting on these key issues by this 
strand of the UK press is highly critical of EU citizenship, typically presenting 
headline-grabbing projections of both the number of incoming ‘EU migrants’ and 
their direct costs to the UK taxpayer.
278
 As Shaw et al observe, there is a certain 
preoccupation within large sections of the UK media that EU migrants opt to 
exercise their Treaty rights in order chiefly to exploit the United Kingdom’s 
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welfare system.
279
 However, we did detect evidence of clear efforts to counter the 
validity of such perceptions within strands of the UK media.
280
 Notably, the 
situation of EU citizens resident in the UK as economically active/self-sufficient 
Member State nationals does not feature prominently in national media, except to 
the extent that such persons and their family members contribute to an overall 
increase in demand for the UK public services (e.g. ‘Urgent need for 250,000 
school places, spending watchdog warns,’ BBC News Online, 15th March 2013 and 
‘EU influx leaves 3,000 children without primary places for the new term,’ Daily 
Mail, 1
st
 Sept 2013).
281
  
 
111. The centre-right UK press also tends periodically to isolate individual 
categories of EU citizens as ‘bad’ or ‘undesirable’ migrants.282 These labels were 
often applied with reference en masse to nationals of the 10 Central and Eastern 
European States that acceded to the European Union in 2004. Interestingly, the 
situation of EU citizens from Western EU Member States is rarely discussed. This 
is despite the fact that nationals from these Member States (and their family 
members) have triggered the most significant extensions in the scope of 
rights/entitlement to social welfare benefits for EU citizens within the United 
Kingdom (e.g. Baumbast; Chen; Bidar; Teixera).
283
 Most recently, Romanian 
nationals – and more specifically: members of the Roma community – have been 
singled out as ‘bad migrants’ by strands of the centre-right press as a target for 
particularly unfavorable treatment. The Daily Express, Daily Mail and Daily 
Telegraph have all run a series of articles on the prospect of an ‘invasion’ by 
Romanian nationals following the lifting of the UK’s transitional arrangements for 
Romanian (and Bulgarian) nationals in January 2014.
284
 Reports in all three papers 
frequently present a distorted image of Romanian nationals. (e.g. ‘The Roma 
invasion of Paris… next stop Britain,’ The Daily Telegraph, 6th Oct. 2013).  
 
 How accurate is national reporting of EU citizenship issues? Can you detect 
evidence of the influence of the media on national public discourse? 
 
112. As the preceding comments indicate, the quality of reporting on EU 
citizenship issues in the UK is generally rather selective and non rights-centered. 
In addition, we suggest that, in places, UK reporting is often misleading. For 
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instance, there is still a tendency to conflate EU citizenship rights with the legal 
framework of rights protection under the ECHR/Human Rights Act.
285
 The UK 
Office of the European Commission publishes official clarifying responses to such 
instances of misreporting on EU issues on a near daily basis.
286
 Its efforts appear 
to have little impact on the quality press reporting by the centre-right British press. 
 
113. It is difficult in a study of this scope and nature to draw robust conclusions on 
the impact of the reporting on EU citizenship issues by the UK media on national 
public discourse. However, on the strength of our limited and illustrative sample, 
we would argue that the mainstream UK media contributes little to the sense of 
EU citizenship as rights-based legal status that is destined to become the 
fundamental status of all Member State nationals. As is perhaps inevitable in the 
national context, issues affecting or related to EU citizens are subsumed within 
broader political debates on e.g. immigration; public service reform; and criminal 
justice. In each context, EU citizens remain easily cast as ‘others’ – as EU 
migrants; welfare tourists; foreign criminals – at least within an influential strand 
of the UK media. There is, of course, a wealth of alternative media sources, 
including internet blogs that offer a more balanced and overtly rights-centered 
analysis of EU citizenship.
287
 However, these attract the attention of more limited, 
specialist audiences. In more general terms, the frequency and intensity of 
negative reporting on EU citizenship issues, particularly as regards social welfare 
entitlements, may also be linked to a rise in support for the United Kingdom 
Independency Party, which campaigns for the UK to exit the European Union.  
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